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19 <br />Dam Overtopping Failures – <br />Lessons Learned from the <br />September 2013 Colorado Flood <br />Event <br />Introduction <br />During the September 2013 flooding in Colorado, nine <br />low hazard dam failures were documented. Forensic <br />investigations for several of these dams identified <br />possible causes of failure. This article shares those <br />possible causes of failure and the lessons learned. It is <br />the intent of this article for engineers and dam owners <br />alike to apply the lessons learned to low hazard dams <br />in an attempt to preserve these vulnerable but <br />valuable structures from failure during events larger <br />than those for which they were designed. <br />The potential for an earthen embankment dam to <br />survive an overtopping event depends on the condition <br />of the dam at the time of the event, the materials used <br />to construct the embankment, the duration and depth <br />of overtopping, and the duration and intensity of the <br />storm event. Small, low hazard embankment dams are <br />typically designed for rain events with return periods <br />between 25 and 100 years. Unlike high and significant <br />hazard dams, most low hazard dams are not designed <br />to safely pass large, infrequent storms and are <br />therefore susceptible to damage and failure during <br />inflow events greater than a 100-year type of event. <br />Higher hazard dams have more stringent spillway <br />design standards due to the consequences associated <br />with their failures. Although consequences to the <br />downstream public due to failure of low hazard dams <br />are less severe, the value of these structures to their <br />owners can be considerable. <br />In this article, case histories of dam overtopping <br />failures that occurred during the September 2013 <br />storm event are presented. Each dam’s condition and <br />performance during the event are reviewed and <br />lessons learned following these dam failures are <br />discussed. <br />The dam failures presented in this article include: <br />x The Upper and Lower Emerald Valley Dams located <br />in the Pikes Peak Region of El Paso County <br />x A series of five dams on the Little Thompson River <br />in the Big Elk Meadows Subdivision within Larimer <br />and Boulder Counties <br />x Carriage Hills No. 2 Dam near Estes Park <br />The lessons learned presented in this article may be <br />old hat for some readers, but it is beneficial for the less <br />experienced dam engineer and owner to understand <br />the sensitivity of dam performance to some of these <br />more common-knowledge issues. <br />September 2013 Storm Event in <br />Colorado <br />The historic rainfall event that occurred between <br />September 8th and 18th, 2013 was responsible for <br />extensive flooding along the Colorado Front Range, <br />extending from El Paso County in the south to Larimer <br />County in the north over an area of approximately <br />11,000 square miles. During this event, several <br />individual storms contributed to the overall <br />precipitation totals; however, a large storm event that <br />occurred on September 12 and ended September 13, <br />2013 was the most significant contributor to the dam <br />failures, setting a one-day rainfall record for Colorado <br />(Doesken 2014). The September 2013 event was one <br />of the top three extreme storms documented in <br />Colorado (Doesken 2014). The maximum measured <br />rainfall for the September 2013 storm was recorded <br />near the town of Boulder and resulted in 20 inches of <br />precipitation over a 10-day period. <br />Emerald Valley Dams <br />The Upper and Lower Emerald Valley Dams (UEV and <br />LEV) are located on Little Fountain Creek on U.S. Forest <br />Service property in the Emerald Valley Ranch Resort, <br />about 6.5 miles southeast of the Pikes Peak summit. <br />An aerial image of the dams is shown in Photo 1. Both <br />dams are classified as low hazard. <br />Due to their small sizes and remote locations, the <br />dams were not previously regulated and no <br />information about the dams was available. The existing <br />condition of the dams was inferred based on <br />conditions observed post-failure and from information <br />obtained as part of the design and reconstruction of <br />these two dams.