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Amendment. The right to make campaign contributions is, of <br /> course, protected by the First Amendment. See Buckley v. Valeo, <br /> 424 U.S. 1, 14-22 (1976); see also Caperton, 556 U.S. at 884 <br /> (recognizing that "[n]ot every campaign contribution by a litigant or <br /> attorney creates a probability of bias that requires a judge's <br /> recusal"). Seizing on that principle, Colorado Municipal League (as <br /> amicus curiae) argues that if we recognize that campaign <br /> contributions could theoretically compromise the impartiality of <br /> elected officials serving in quasi-judicial capacities, then we <br /> effectively tell potential contributors to "forego your First <br /> Amendment rights and eschew contributions that may make it <br /> impossible for the elected official to perform . . . [her] job." <br /> 0n Such absolutist rhetoric ignores the fact that Caperton, by its <br /> terms, is limited to "extraordinary situation[s]." Caperton, 556 U.S. <br /> at 887. Indeed, the Court squarely addressed the dissent's similar <br /> contention that the ruling would lead to "unnecessary interference <br /> with judicial elections" by emphasizing that the immediate facts <br /> were "extreme by any measure," and that the holding was "confined <br /> to rare instances." Id. at 887-90. Implicit in this conclusion is a <br /> conciliation between First Amendment and due process rights, <br /> 27 <br />