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part of an adjudicatory decision-maker. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 887. <br /> Though it is true that the decision-maker Caperton was a judicial <br /> officer, he was an elected judicial officer. Id. at 873. The principle <br /> is therefore equally applicable here, where a local elected official <br /> performs quasi-adjudicatory acts. <br /> Permitting such inquiries is also consistent with our <br /> precedent. We have previously recognized that "the absence of a <br /> personal, financial, or official stake in the decision" is a necessary <br /> component of impartial adjudication. Scott, 672 P.2d at 228 <br /> (emphasis added). The notion that campaign contributions can <br /> never — regardless of their size, timing, or apparent effect — qualify <br /> as a "financial" stake in a quasi-judicial proceeding is questionable <br /> and inconsistent with case law. <br /> Our primary concern is the Due Process Clause, and its <br /> promise that individuals appearing before quasi-judicial bodies are <br /> guaranteed an impartial decision-maker. See Ruff, 235 P.3d at <br /> 1056. That constitutional guarantee must be protected regardless <br /> of how the decision-maker arrived at a position. <br /> �i Bearing that in mind, we understand that our conclusion may <br /> implicate other constitutional rights — most prominently, the First <br /> 26 <br />