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whereby campaign contributions are constitutionally permissible <br /> outside of extraordinary situations. The extraordinary situation <br /> arises when — because of their size, timing, and apparent effect — <br /> the contribution violates another's due process rights to an <br /> impartial adjudication. <br /> -�r This position fairly balances the vital First Amendment right to <br /> make campaign contributions and the equally important due <br /> process right to a neutral decision-maker. See Buckley, 424 U.S. <br /> 14-22; Ruff, 235 P.3d at 1056. Accordingly, we conclude that <br /> campaign contributions to an elected official serving in a <br /> quasi-judicial capacity constitute "a direct, personal, substantial, <br /> pecuniary interest" sufficient to trigger a due process analysis <br /> under Caperton. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 876 (quoting Tumey, 273 <br /> U.S. at 523). <br /> 2. Caperton Analysis <br /> 55 With that threshold question answered, we turn to NLGC's <br /> contention that the district court erred by concluding that <br /> Donnelly's failure to recuse after receiving certain campaign <br /> contributions did not violate its due process rights to a neutral <br /> decision-maker. NLGC argues the court misapplied Caperton in <br /> 28 <br />