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<br />0098, <br /> <br />activities are immune from state regulation unless <br />there is a .clear congressional mandate,. or <br />.specific congressional action,. providing-for state <br />control. <br /> <br />Id. at 564 (citing Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. <br />ITo, 122 (1954); Paul v. Unlted States, 371 U.S. 245, 263 (1963); <br />Hancock v. Train,~ U.S. 167, 178-81 (1976); EPA v. State <br />Water Resources Control Board, 426 U.S. 200, 2l~217, 221 <br />(1976)). <br /> <br />Under either theory, the conclusion reached by Solicitor <br />Krulitz as to the applicable legal analysis is the same: <br /> <br />[T]O the extent Congress has not clearly granted <br />authority to the states over waters which are <br />in, on, under or appurtenant to federal lands, the <br />Federal Government maintains its sovereign rights in <br />such waters and may put them to use irrespective <br />of state law. <br /> <br />Id. at 563. Krulitz concluded that neither the equal footing <br />aoctrine 66/ nor the Acts of 1866 and 1870 67/ and the <br />Desert Land Act 68/ constituted the necessary clear grant <br />of authority over-unappropriated waters on federal lands to <br /> <br />66/ Solicitor Krulitz concluded that the equal footing <br />aoctrine (see p. 15 supra), which is generally relied on to <br />support state claims of ownership of unappropriated waters, <br />did not divest the United States of its ownership inter.ests <br />in unappropriated waters, because (1) the state acts of <br />admission into the Union contained no express grant of ownership, <br />such as is required when the United States divests itself of <br />its property rights; and (2) state ownership of unappropriated <br />water at the time of admission into the Union is "difficult <br />to square with the reserved rights doctrine . . . as applied <br />to reservations of land in a state after statehood.. Krulitz <br />Op. at 564. <br /> <br />67/ Solicitor Krulitz interpreted the 1866 and 1870 Mining <br />Acts to waive the United States' .proprietary and riparian rights <br />to water on the public domain [only] to the extent that water is <br />appropriated by members of the public under state law. . . ." <br />Krulitz Op. at 565. By negative implication, because the <br />acts did not deal with the federal government's rights to <br />use that water, they recognized the United States' "inchoate <br />water rights to unappropriated water that exist at any <br />point in time." Id. at 565-66. <br /> <br />68/ Solicitor Krulitz interpreted the Desert Land Act as a <br />statute of limited applicability that .does not directly address <br />federal rights to use water for congressionally authorized pur- <br />poses on the federal lands, but instead is aimed at appropriation <br />and use 'by the public.'. Krulitz Op. at 566-70. <br /> <br />- 42 - <br />