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~ 0099-, the states, and therefore that the federal government may use that water without interference from the states. Thus, he asserted that by these "relatively narrow"acti, the United States did not divest itself of its authority "to use the unappropriated waters on public lands for governmental purposes." Id. at 569 (emphasis in original). Solicitor Krulitz acknowledged that the language of the Supreme Court in United States v. New Mexico, supra, that, in the absence of a reserved right "there arises the contrary in- ference that Congress intended federal agencies to acquire water in the same manner as any other public or private appropriator" (438 U.S. at 702) makes it unclear whether federal agencies must conform the assertion of non-reserved federal water rights to state law. He concluded, however, that the Court could not have intended to suggest that state procedural or substantive law would control federal non-reserved uses, because requiring federal agencies to assert non-reserved water rights only for purposes recognized as beneficial under state law would lead to the "anomalous result" that federal land managers would have to manage the same kind of federal land differently in different states. Rather, he argued that the Court intended only to suggest that water rights other than those available as reserved rights must be acquired through some form of appropriation and actual use, and not merely through a reservation of land. Id. at 576-77. As a matter of policy, Solicitor Krulitz recommended that federal agencies comply with procedures established by the states "to the greatest practicable extent." He did not conclude, however, that compliance with state procedural requirements is required as a matter of law. Id. at 577-78. In the second portion of his opinion Solicitor Krulitz outlined reserved and non-reserved federal water rights available to the land management divisions of the Department of Interior. He acknowledged that the Taylor Grazing Act and the Federal Land policy Management Act ("FLPMA") do not create any reserved rights, but concluded that those statutes express a congressional mandate that the public domain be managed for multiple use and sustained yield purposes, including recreational campgrounds, timber production, livestock grazing, and minimum instream flows necessary to protect and enhance fish and wildlife resources and scenic values. Therefore, he concluded that the BLM may appropriate any water on the public domain necessary to fulfill those purposes. See id. at 615. With respect to the National Park Service ana-tne Fish and Wildlife Service, Solicitor Krulitz concluded that those agencies may appropriate (in addition to water available as reserved rights) all unappropriated water necessary to - 43 -