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<br />,I 0097 <br /> <br />use, and its measure is the amount of water reasonably necessary <br />for that use. By contrast, reserved rights have priority as <br />of the date of the reservation, regardless of when or whether <br />the water was put to use, and extend to all water reasonably <br />necessary for current and future uses. See, ~.~., Cappaert <br />v. United States, supra, 426 U.S. at 138. <br /> <br />Solicitor Krulitz rested his opinion on an asserted <br />federal proprietary interest in unappropriated waters in <br />the western states and the federal government's superior right <br />under the Supremacy Clause to make use of water in furtherance <br />of its constitutional powers. See Comment, "Federal Non- <br />Reserved vlater Rights," 15 Land-ar1d Water L. Rev. 67, 74-75 (1980). <br />He started with the premise that, through cession from foreign <br />nations, the United States acquired ownership of the lands <br />that now comprise the western states and ownership of all <br />rights appurtenant to those lands, including "the power to <br />control the disposition and use of water on, under, flowing <br />through or appurtenant to such lands." Krulitz Op. at 563, <br />575. He asserted that under the Property Clause of the <br />Constitution, the United States has plenary power to control <br />its property; no interest in that property may be acquired, <br />by the states or private parties, "in the absence of an <br />express grant from Congress. . . ." Solicitor Krulitz <br />concluded that "absent that grant or consent, [the property] <br />continues to be held by the United States." 651 rd. (citing <br />United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229, <br />235 (1960); Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 <br />U.S. 389, 404-05 (1917)). solicitor Krulitz buttressed this <br />conclusion with a Supremacy Clause argument: <br /> <br />Federal control over its needed water rights, un- <br />hampered by compliance with procedural and <br />substantive state law, is supported by the <br />Supremacy Clause and the doctrine that federal <br /> <br />651 However, Solicitor Krulitz disavowed statements made by <br />a-prior Interior Department Solicitor that the United States <br />is the "owner of unappropriated non-navigable water on the <br />public domain" as "broad and irrelevant to the right <br />of the United States to make use of such water." He stated <br />that "concepts of 'ownership' of unappropriated waters are <br />not determinative in federal-state relations in non-reserved <br />water rights." Krulitz Op. at 613. Solicitor Krulitz's <br />partial disavowal of the proprietary basis for federal claims <br />is somewhat confusing and seems inconsistent with his statements <br />that the federal government has a retained "proprietary <br />interest" in waters not otherwise appropriated pursuant to <br />state law and "plenary power" over unappropriated waters on <br />federal lands by virtue of the Property Clause. See, ~.~., <br />id. at 563, 575. --- <br /> <br />- 41 - <br />