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Last modified
1/26/2010 12:48:28 PM
Creation date
10/11/2006 11:31:17 PM
Metadata
Fields
Template:
Water Supply Protection
File Number
8407.400
Description
Platte River Basin - River Basin General Publications - Nebraska
State
NE
Basin
South Platte
Water Division
1
Date
1/1/1983
Author
Nebraska Natural Res
Title
Policy Issue Study on Selected Water Rights Issues - Property Rights in Groundwater
Water Supply Pro - Doc Type
Report/Study
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<br />tn_II) .;.) ~ <br /> <br />and vest it in overlying landowners and other <br />water users. Overlying owners, however, would <br />be treated equally without regard to history of <br />use. Present users might still be favored over <br />future users, however, depending on the judicial <br />construction 01 the requirement of apportion- <br />ment in times of shortage. <br /> <br />Physical-Hydrologic and Environmental <br />Impacts <br /> <br />Codifying existing law, by itself, would have no <br />physical-hydrologic or environmental impacts <br />apart from the current situation. <br /> <br />CONCLUSION <br /> <br />Nebraska is in a unique and enviable position <br />in comparison with most states when it comes to <br />legal and institutional barriers to change in the <br />structure of groundwater property rights. The <br />clear statements in Nebraska law indicating that <br />groundwater is publiC property give the legisla- <br />ture great latitude in developing a fair and <br />equitable system for allocating groundwater <br />among competing users. <br />Many of the possible allocation mechanisms <br />which might be adopted, however, would result in <br />the creation of vested private property rights <br />which would limit future flexibility of action. Any <br />regulation of the use of groundwater must <br />observe the limits set by these private property <br />rights. On the other hand, if intelligient decisions <br />are to be made regarding the use of groundwater, <br />it is necessary that the parameters of the <br />property right be defined with some degree <?l <br />certainty. The tension that must be resolved IS <br />between the certainty of a system of private <br />groundwater property rights and the flexibility of <br />a system of publiC groundwater property nghts. <br />This tension is exacerbated by the fact that any <br />redefinition of property rights means that some <br />citizens will gain more than others, although <br />there need not necessarily be any losers. The <br />fact remains, however, that many individuals and <br />groups have equitable claims to the existing <br />stock of groundwater, and a groundwater <br />property rights system necessarily determines <br />which equitable claims will be satIsfied and <br />which will not. <br /> <br />FOOTNOTES <br /> <br />1. Economics is the science of human choice <br />in a world where resources are limited and <br />wants are insatiable. In addressing the <br />economic impact of various water policy <br /> <br />2 <br /> <br />alternatives it is necessary to locus both on <br />the problem of resource utilization and on <br />the problem of want satisfaction, topics <br />subsumed within the broad label of eco- <br />nomic efficiency. Economists commonly <br />distinguish between productive efficiency <br />and allocative efficiency. Productive effi- <br />ciency is achieved when resources are <br />combined to create the most output for the <br />least cost. Thus. a change is productively <br />efficient if it allows society to produce more <br />goods at the same cost or the same amount <br />of goods at a lower cost. Allocative effi- <br />ciency, in contrast, relates to the distribution <br />of produced goods among the members of <br />society, whether presently living or yet to be <br />born. A change is allocatively efficient if it <br />will increase the satisfaction of at least one <br />member of society without decreasing the <br />satisfaction of another (pareto superiority), <br />or if it will increase the satisfaction of some <br />members of society more than it will de- <br />crease the satisfaction of other members of <br />society (Kaldor-Hicks efficiency). An eco- <br />nomic system is thus said to be efficient if it <br />allocates existing resources so as to max- <br />imize the production derived from them,and <br />if it distributes the goods produced in a <br />manner that maximizes consumer welfare. <br />Equity refers to how society's wealth is <br />distributed among the members of society. <br />Changes in equity are reflected in changes <br />in the distribution of wealth. Evaluation of <br />equity impacts is difficult, however, as equity <br />is essentially a philosophical concept, not <br />an economic one. <br />An efficient transaction, for instance could <br />be thwarted if an individual was required to <br />negotiate with several parties, each of <br />whom would be negligibly impacted by the <br />proposed conduct. Efficiency gains often <br />can be offset by such transactions, thereby <br />effectively blocking the efficiency gain. <br />See generally Calabresi, Transaction <br />Costs_ Resource Allocation and liability <br />Rules - A Comment, 11 J LAW & ECON 67 <br />11968). <br />This is a particular problem where legal <br />rules are unclear making completely <br />accurate information available only at the <br />cost of ex post litigation. <br />The relationship between effiCiency and <br />equity must be understood. Efficiencygains <br />are independent of equity impact. Thus, if A <br />can make more efficient use of water owned <br />by B than can B himself, it is efficiency to <br />transfer the water to B. A need not pay for <br />the water for the transfer to be efficient. <br />Whether A is required to pay lor the water or <br /> <br />3 <br /> <br />4 <br /> <br />5. <br /> <br />6 <br /> <br />3.19 <br />
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