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<br />3-18 <br /> <br />3) <br /> <br />fair share of the groundwater found be- <br />neath lands that they can own. <br />The right of overlying landowners to <br />capture and use groundwater found <br />beneath the surface of their lands is <br />limited to the amount of groundwater that <br />can be put to reasonable and beneficial <br />use on overlying land owned by the land- <br />owner. <br />Any use of groundwater on the overlying <br />land is declared to be reasonable and <br />beneficial provided that the use is suit- <br />able to the character of the overlying land <br />and provided that the use does not con- <br />stitute waste. <br />Captured groundwater may not be trans- <br />ferred off the overlying land owned by the <br />withdrawing party without express public <br />approval. <br />The right of each and every landowner <br />overlying a particular aquifer to capture <br />and use groundwater found beneath their <br />lands is correlative with and limited by the <br />rights of all other overlying owners. <br />If groundwater supplies are insufficient to <br />meet the reasonable and beneficial <br />needs of all overlying owners, overlying <br />owners are entitled to have existing <br />supplies apportioned among themselves. <br />Groundwater supplies are insufficient to <br />meet the reasonable and beneficial <br />needs of overlying owners whenever <br />average annual withdrawals are expect- <br />ed to exceed average annual natural <br />recharge. <br />In apportioning groundwater in times of <br />shortage, consideration shall be given to <br />the geologic and hydrologic parameters <br />of an underlying aquifer, the amount of <br />water in storage, the number of acres <br />overlying the aquifer, the character of the <br />land overlying the aquifer, and the size, <br />character, and underlying aquifer char- <br />acteristics of particular tracts of land <br />among which the water is to be ap- <br />portioned. <br />Judicial apportionment of groundwater in <br />time of shortage shall be without regard <br />to history of use and without regard to <br />present or future intent to commence or <br />continue use. <br />Supplies of groundwater in excess of the <br />reasonable and beneficial needs of over- <br />lying owners, may, with public consent, be <br />transferred away from the overlying lands <br />and overlying landowners will not be <br />deemed to have suffered any compen- <br />sable injury as a consequence of the <br />transfer. <br /> <br />4) <br /> <br />5) <br /> <br />6) <br /> <br />7) <br /> <br />8) <br /> <br />9) <br /> <br />10) <br /> <br />11 ) <br /> <br />12) Landowners who acquire groundwater <br />property rights pursuant to the above <br />sections may not sell, give, lease, or in any <br />manner convey the rights to water so <br />acquired without the express consent of <br />the public. <br />13) Nothing in the above sections shall be <br />construed to prevent parties possessing <br />the power of eminent domain from acquir- <br />ing the rights of overlying owners through <br />eminent domain proceedings. <br /> <br />While the above formulation is not necessarily <br />the way in which the Nebraska Supreme Court <br />would resolve all issues of Nebraska law, it is <br />consistent with existing law and could probably <br />be implemented without constitutional object- <br />ion. A major limitation of the approach, however, <br />is the use of judicial allocation in place of admin- <br />istrative allocation. It would likely be more ex- <br />pensive to allocate through repeated litigation <br />than through administrative actions. Further- <br />more, judicial allocation over time is less likely to <br />yield consistent results than would an adminis- <br />trative procedure. Additional major weaknesses <br />of the above approach include the absence of <br />any explicit mechanism to consider the mining of <br />groundwater, prohibitions on transfers and <br />perhaps pooling of groundwater rights, the lack <br />of any written documentation of the existence of <br />a groundwater right, and lack of specific direct- <br />ives as to how specific provisions such as the <br />"public trust" and "apportionment" are to be <br />implemented. On the other hand, a formulation <br />similar to that above would clarify many nebulous <br />points in current law and give the courts greater <br />legislative direction than has been present in the <br />past. <br /> <br />Socio-Economic Impacts <br /> <br />Codifying existing law would result in a sub- <br />stantial increase in landowner's security of right <br />to groundwater. All else being equal, an increase <br />in security of right would enhance the prospect of <br />achieving economic efficiency. Codifying exist- <br />ing law, however, would significantly decrease <br />flexibility that might be required to address <br />changed circumstances in the future. Thus, the <br />relative efficiency of the perceived existing set of <br />rules is all important. Although existing law as <br />defined in this alternative is not necessarily <br />efficient, it is, for the most part, consistent with <br />efforts to achieve economic efficiency. A major <br />problem with existing law, however, is its silence <br />on the issue of groundwater mining, an activity <br />that might, at times, be efficient. <br />From an equity perspective, this alternative <br />would transfer wealth from the general public <br />