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.....~,. ,f! II:- iJ .1 ..... ..... . ,_ J I.. Mexican Affairs staff to develop a U.S. negotiating position. Not surprisingly, it was to be based on eliminating the effects of Wellton-Mohawk return flows on Mexico's treaty deliveries, and would tie Mexican water quality to that at Imperial Dam. The U.S. would negotiate a salinity differential, not a level. In mid-April, National Security Advisor Kissinger sent a memo to President Nixon, endorsing the Brownell report. He also rejected the Executive Office's irrigation efficiency alternative as not pennanent,22 The President officially accepted those recommendations on May 5, and appointed Brownell as his chief negotiator. Secretary of State William P. Rogers flew to Mexico City to present the U.S. position to President Echeverria on May 13. ) During the summer of 1973, Bureau of Reclamation and mwc staff developed the fonnula for a salinity differential that would serve as the basis for the U.S. offer to Mexico: the U.S. would guarantee Mexico that its treaty deliveries would have an average annual salinity level no more than 115 ppm higher than the level at Imperial Dam, plus or minus 30 ppm. These figures were based on probable variations in Colorado River salinity that would have occurred in the absence of Wellton-Mohawk drainage. The Bureau completed preliminary studies to configure the engineering works included in the Brownell proposal, and prepared confirming technical reports. On June 8, Brownell was accorded Ambassadorial rank. Negotiations took place through the summer. Brownell and the State Department kept Congressional leaders and the Committee of Fourteen informed of the progress of talks. Oddly, ....,,) there 'was no official disclosure of the Brownell recommendations until the new Minute was signed. Mexico accepted the basic U.S. offer, and Minute No. 242, guaranteeing Mexico that the average annual salinity of its treaty deliveries would be no more than 115 ppm higher than the salinity of water behind Imperial Dam-plus or minus 30 ppm-was signed on August 30, 1973.23 The Legislative History of P.L. 93-320 As soon as the Minute was officially signed, the Departments of Interior and State began to draft implementing legislation. Because of internal differences within the agencies and the involvement of an unusual number of individuals in the process, progress was slow, particularly in Interior. It was further impeded by arguments between Interior and OMB over such issues as how the desalting plant should be procured and who should have responsibility for its construction. OMB feared that the plant would set a precedent for Federally funded, public- works-style solutions to water quality problems (as indeed its supporters in OSW hoped it would). It insisted that the Secretary of State (acting through mwC) rather than the Secretary of the Interior, construct, operate, and maintain the browoell,rpl 10 September 1991