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<br />OC:SJ1 <br /> <br />plant. Assignment of this responsibility to the State Department was intended to <br />make it clear that the desalting plant was a unique response to an international <br />problem. Within the Executive Branch, OMB finally prevailed, although the <br />Congress later disagreed. P.L 93-320 vested authority for Title I in the Secretary <br />of the Interior, who designated the Bureau of Reclamation as the construction <br />agency. <br /> <br />Because of these delays, the Administration's bills were not sent to the Congress <br />until February 7, 1974. Minute No. 242 called for passage of implementing <br />legislation by July 1, 1974. Concerned members in both Houses had already <br />introduced their own bills, drafted with the assistance of the Committee of <br />Fourteen (and the Lower Colorado Region of the Bureau of Reclamation, which <br />provided a drafting service): H.R. 12165 was introduced by Rep. Harold T. (Bizz) <br />Johnson of California on January 21, and S. 2940, by Senators Paul Fannin of <br />Arizona and Alan Bible of Nevada on February 1. <br /> <br />These Congressional bills were the basis of hearings and mark-up; the <br />Administration bills were largely ignored. The House held three days of hearings <br />on March 4, 5, and 8. The Senate hearings on April 26 lasted one day. <br /> <br />~ <br /> <br />During the hearings there was relatively little debate over Minute No. 242 or the <br />. basic elements of the solution. Considering that the Minute was more of an <br />'.. amendment to the 1944 treaty than an interpretation of its terms, the Senate might <br />:: have insisted on ratifying it, but no such suggestion appears on the record. The <br />, states, their Congressional representatives, and agency witnesses soft-peddled their <br />concerns and disagreements. The premise behind the Minute and the workability <br />of the technical measures that were to implement the agreement were never really <br />examined. <br /> <br />The states did raise several questions never answered by Administration witnesses, <br />though-questions that may come back to haunt the Federal government when the <br />desalting plant finally comes on line: <br /> <br />. Why is the Federal government committing over $100 million to solve a <br />water quality problem at the border, while ignoring projected increases <br />in salinity above Imperial Dam? Why has it not taken a basin-wide <br />approach? <br /> <br />. Why have no provisions been made for permanent replacement of water <br />lost in the effluent (brine) stream from the desalting plant? <br /> <br />. Where will the Federal government obtain power to run the desalting <br />plant? <br /> <br />. Will the desalting plant work?24 <br /> <br />brownell,rpt <br /> <br />11 <br /> <br />September 1991 <br />