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then by definition, that would -be appropriator's intended use is <br />not a beneficial use. As a result, RICD applications require <br />proof of these two additional elements before the water court <br />may decree a conditional water right.' <br />To read SB 216 otherwise would disregard its plain <br />language, see, e.g. In re 2000 -2001 Dist. Grand Jury 97 P.3d <br />at 924; Pierson, 48 P.3d at 1218 -19, and render the RICD <br />definitional language superfluous, failing to give effect to <br />every word used by the General Assembly, see, e.g. Slack 5 <br />P.3d at 284. Indeed, if the General Assembly had not intended <br />the definition of a RICD to have a separate meaning, then it <br />would not have added it to the definition. See, e.g. Carlson <br />85 P.3d at 509. <br />In short, we hold that the starting point for the water <br />court's analysis of a RICD application is the definition of a <br />RICD provided by the General Assembly. Unless the application <br />is limited to the minimum stream flow for a reasonable <br />Of course, an applicant also must show that it falls within the <br />appropriate "class" of applicants — a county, municipality, city <br />and county, water district, water and sanitation district, water <br />conservation district, or water conservancy district. § 37 -92- <br />103(10.3). Furthermore, an applicant must demonstrate that it <br />is diverting, capturing, controlling, and beneficially using the <br />water between specific points defined by physical control <br />structures. § 37- 92- 103(10.3). The satisfaction of these <br />elements, however, is not contested in this case. <br />31 <br />