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1004 Consensus-Based Management opment. As long as particular program actions are imple- mented, program participants assume that the program is successful. This checklist approach advances bureau- cracy but does little to advance actual recovery. If success were measured by population changes, the recovery program would likely be judged a failure. Al- though it is extraordinarily difficult to measure small fish populations and the available evidence is hardly uniform, scientific evidence seems to show that populations con- tinue to decline (Stanford & Nelson 1994). Many local bi- . ologists believe the fishes will never be removed from the endangered list and will require human intervention (through the continued implementation of the recovery program) in perpetuity. Some biologists argue that achiev- ing delisting of a species has little to do with the biologi- cal recovery of that species. They insist that the ESA's numerical requirements for delisting do not correspond with the species' ecological resilience. Thus, although the recovery program may reach its individual project goals, it may not achieve the ultimate goal of species re- covery. Because of the subjective measures of programmatic progress, participants often cannot agree on which ac- tions are successes and which are failures. Likewise, be- cause there is no universal agreement on the program's direction, participants mistrust the motives of other par- ticipants. Many fear that their colleagues are pursuing political rather than biological goals, to the detriment of the fishes. This may be true. For instance, one participat- ing scientist worries that environmental representatives are more concerned about the reauthorization of the ESA than about endangered fishes. Thus the conflicted motives of some environmentalists have weakened their collective voice, leading to a more broad-scale pattern of goal displacement. This pattern, best described as dis- placement behavior, is a sociological phenomenon in which "the orgaitizational means become transformed into ends-in-themselves and displace the principal goals of the organization" (Merton 1957). Displacement behavior is pervasive throughout the pro- gram. It has caused constituents to overlook difficult is- sues and focus on simple, attainable goals that only mar- ginally benefit the fishes. Just as environmentalists have superimposed ESA reauthorization onto the Colorado River conflict, the program has shifted its focus from water and habitat management to activities such as population stocking. According to one program participant, the Col- orado Division ofWlldlife has chosen to support fish hatch- eries rather than focus on key threats, such as sport fish- ing in native fish habitat. Similarly, water users support non-native fish eradication rather than address problems of flow management. After all, it is easier to construct fISh hatcheries and control non-native species than to re- strict human water usage. This displacement behavior has caused the recovery program to focus on procedural progress and consensus Conservation Biology Volume 15. No.4. August 2001 ~< ~ Brower et at. among program participants rather than on the more rei. evant problems of the fishes. Conveniently, because the bureaucratic process has superceded recovery, no one is responsible for the fate of the' fishes. Blame for declining populations is displaced to the recovery program bu. reaucracy rather than resting with program participants or relevant agencies. People within the program can cer. tainly claim success when individual components are implemented, but no one is forced to consider the big. ger picture. As a former state agency director has asked, "if the recovery implementation program succeeds in implementing the actions identified in the [plan]. but the species populations do not respond as expected, who should bear the consequences?" As it stands, no one bears responsibility for population declines. Discrepancy in the Power of Participating Voices Although the recovery program's consensus-based ap- proach involves all relevant stakeholders, global partici- pation does not assure each voice equal weight. The program suffers from inequality in constituent voices due to political and fiscal power discrepancies, differing degrees of clarity of purpose among interest groups, and pervasive scientific uncertainty. One participant expressed concern that water users dominate the program, because they control program funding. In fact, the water developers have employed a lobbying group that works closely with USFWS represen- tatives. Together, this team presents funding proposals to the U.S. Congress. Hydropower production, ostensibly managed by the Bureau of Reclamation and the Western Area Power Administration, yet also promoted by water developers, provides the remaining programmatic fund- ing. Because the USFWS and other participants rely on the support and influence of water users and power pro- duction to secure funding, little resistance is offered to their proposals for water management and development. In addition to political and fiscal causes for the power differential, the interest groups also have differing de- grees of consensus about goals among their own constit- uents. The water developers unilaterally seek to profit from the exploitation of the Colorado River's hydrologi- cal resources. In contrast, the environmentalists repre- sent a broader constituency and thus lack a comparable clarity of purpose; Many environmentalists agree that the recovery program has failed to help the fishes, yet the community as a whole has not agreed on an alterna- tive. Some want to eliminate the existing recovery pro- gram and develop a new recovery strategy. Others be- lieve this would ultimately harm the' fishes because of the resulting reduction of funding for scientific research. Still others are loath to oppose the recovery program for fear of jeopardizing reauthorization of the ESA.