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Brou'er et 01. .. According to participants, the program was formed in reaction to escalating debates over water rights, flow. recommendations, and declining fish health. During the early and mid-1980s, the Colorado Basin states became increasingly aware that a failure to re- cover the endangered fishes could impede continued water development. In particular, developers feared the force of the ESA, "the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any nation" (Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill 1978). Indeed, pursuant to the ESA, water Users had to participate in a federal permitting process prior to the approval of each proposed development (Shields 1998). The proposed water-development project would be de- nied if it were considered a threat, or "jeopardy," to a listed species, unless the developer proposed a satisfac- tory "reasonable and prudent alternative" for the antici- pated effect (ESA 1973). Water users feared that the government would construe the reduced stream flow as- sociated with continued development as jeopardizing the listed fishes, forcing them to forego water use to secure instream flows. To deal with the potential impasse between conserva- tion and development, Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming were faced with the choice of litigating, attempting to amend the ESA, halting water development, or negotiat- ing a solution (Lochhead 1996). A regional foundation for negotiations was laid in the early 1980s, when the states and water users joined to lobby against recovery plans that the USFWS had proposed for the fishes. In 1984 the USFWS, the Bureau of Reclamation, and the states drafted a memorandum of understanding allowing the USFWS to use a program of reasonable and prudent alternatives in evaluating the effects of water develop- ment and depletion on the fishes, while recognizing state water laws and traditional water apportionments. Three years of negotiations and public comment fol- lowed, finally resulting in the, 1987 Colorado River Re- covery Implementation Program. These collective efforts have led to some notable achievements. For example, the recovery program has precipitated research on the rare and poorly docu- mented Colorado River fishes. It has also facilitated de- velopment of scarce water resources: over 200 water de- velopment projects involving nearly 700,000 acre-feet (863 million cubic meters) of water have been approved since 1988, and not one has been litigated under the ESA (Shields 1998). Furthermore, and perhaps most impor- tant, all relevant stakeholders have been included, at least superficially, in the lengthy decision-making process. Nonetheless, fish populations are not recovering (Tyus 1992; Bolin 1993; Stanford & Nelson 1994; Modde et al, 1996; Modde & Wick 1997). By the most optimistic pop- ulation estimates, the fishes' numbers have not changed during the recovery program's lifetime; at worst, two of the species are thought to have been locally extirpated , I I .J... COllsellsus-Based Malltlgemertt 1003 (Tyus 1992; Bolin 1993; Stanford & Nelson 1994; Colo- rado River Recovery Implementation Program 1996). Thus, although negotiations have successfully allowed water development, the fishes seem likely to remain on the en- dangered species list for the indeterminate future. Although the recovery program has certainly facili- tated agreements between diverse constituencies, its failure at species recovery must not be overlooked. Ad- vocates of consensus-based management hail its benefits in terms of multiple-constituent participation, but the key indicator of success should be based on achieve- ments toward recovery, not on whether participants communicate openly as populations decline. We at- tribute the program's failure to increase fish populations to two major weaknesses in the consensus-based ap- proach: (1) participants are preoccupied with political agendas rather than species recovery, rendering the fate of the fishes a secondary goal to the process itself, and (2) although all relevant stakeholders participate in the , recovery program, not all voices carry equal power. Procedural Politics and Programmatic Goals To accomplish the goals of developing water and help- ing the fishes, the recovery program enumerates five ele- ments: habitat management; habitat development and maintenance; native fish stocking; non-native species management; and research, monitoring, and data man- agement (Colorado River Recovery Implementation Pro- gram 1987). The USFWS has determined that progress on these recovery elements will adequately offset the ad- verse effects of water project development (Lochhead 1996). Therefore, pursuant to the ESA, the program's re- covery projects serve as a reasonable and prudent alter- native to jeopardy determinations for development plans (Lochhead 1996). As such, the existence of a consensus- based recovery program prevents a federally mandated moratorium on water development. In measuring progress, the recovery program does not focus on the statuS of fish populations but rather on checklists included in the annual status reports that de- lineate program accomplishments (Colorado River Re- covery Implementation Program 1997a, 1998a, 1999). The status reports and related sufficient-progress reports theoretically assure the program director that the pro- gram is serving as a reasonable and prudent alternative to jeopardy (Colorado River Recovery Implementation Program 1997b, 1998b). Although each report mentions fish populations, pro- gram success has actually been measured by bureau- cratic achievement. As a prime example, meeting a cer- tain target for native fish stocking is considered a success regardless of the long-term effects on the exist- ing population. Presumably, these mitigation measures offset the harmful biological effects of continued devel- Conservation Biology Volume 15, No.4, August 2001