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Brower et at. Historically, environmentalists have been successful with lawsuits involving species listings and critical habi- tat, but such victories are not always easy. For instance, the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund (now EarthJustice Legal Defense Fund) had to wage a difficult lawsuit to at- tain endangered status and critical habitat designation for the razorback sucker (Xyrauchen texanus) (Colo- rado Wildlife Federation v. Turner 1992). Environmen- talists are therefore uncertain whether a legal challenge to the recovery program would improve the plight of the fishes, especially because they fear a Pyrrhic victory. This uncertainty makes the environmentalists' political voice weaker than that of the more unified water users. The program's consensus requirement exacerbates this power disparity and has been highlighted by partici- pants as an impediment to progress. A consensus rule means that each interest group holds veto power. Ac- cording to one participant, the veto has sometimes pre- vented "bad" actions but has more often resulted in inac- tivity and marginal policies. The consensus model would benefit from a provision preventing such unilateral stone- walling by individual interest groups. Recommendations With increasing emphasis on "big science" in attempts to manage endangered species and habitats, the Colorado River Recovery Implementation Program is no longer ex- ceptional. In fact, the program has become a paradigm for the administration of large-scale conservation projects such as the Columbia River and San Francisco Bay. Al- though the concept of multiconstituent participation and cooperation seems ideal, consensus-based management may not be the panacea it is often touted to be (Bernard & Young 1997). We suggest the following recommenda- tions to improve future consensus-based endeavors. Link Program Success to Population Growth The conflict in the Colorado River Basin is representa- tive of the tension between development and conserva- tion throughout the nation. Consensus-based manage- ment is one powerful tool for tackling these conflicts by asserting local control while allowing all interests to be heard. Yet the process of consensus, through its reliance on bureaucratic progress, can become more important than the ultimate goals of the original program, epito- mizing displacement behavior. To recover endangered fishes andto improve consen- sus-based management in general, we recommend a check on the absolute power that consensus appears to wield. If consensus-based management were not a virtually au- tomatic route to reasonable and prudent alternative sta- tus, measures of success would rely less on bureaucratic process and more on progress toward species recovery. Consensus-Based Management 1005 One critical component of improved consensus-based management is thus the creation of more sensible indi- cators for conservation success. Accordingly, actual pop- ulation growth, rather than bureaucratic accomplishments, should serve as the appropriate gauge. Of course, this recommendation, and the ones that follow, depend on stronger, more centralized USFWS control to ensure that population counts are reliable and that monitoring is consistent. Maintain Threat of a]eopardy Opinion Forbidding Further Development without Population Growth The Colorado experience demonstrates how consensus- based management can be exploited to circumvent the ESA. By proposing a cooperative agreement supported by diverse local constituent groups and the USFWS, par- ticipants reduce the risk of a jeopardy opinion for future proposals in the project area, allowing development de- spite potentially harmful effects to endangered species. Without a credible jeopardy threat, program partici- pants may substitute procedural goalS for population re- covery. Thus a region can virtually avoid the require- ments of the ESA and regulate its own development. Because different constituencies each recognize some benefit from cooperation, the' program has somehow garnered the support of all participants, sacrificing pro- tections for Colorado River fishes in the process. This recommendation relates to the first by emphasizing the need to create a sense of programmatic accountability to the fishes. Consensus should not immunize projects from a jeopardy opinion. Although delisting should be the ultimate goal of any recovery program, alternative short-term goals should also be created. By maintaining the threat of a jeopardy opinion, notwithstanding con- sensus, species recovery is more likely to remain a prior. ity. This would prohibit further water development in the face of continued population decline. The potential threat of statutory sanctions would re- duce procedural stonewalling by ensuring that the pro- gram is guided by the ESA rather than the interests of a few recalcitrant participants. Retaining the link between the right to develop water and the status of fish popula- tions would not only switch the focus from politics to population recovery, but would also increase individual accountability and encourage ecological rather than pro- cedural progress. Mitigate Power Differentials among Stakeholders The role that recovery program stakeholders play in se- curing funding aggravates the power disparity between water users and environmentalists. Much of the pro- gram's funding is at least indirectly generated by water development and hydropower. Increased federal fund- ~i , , ,.~ Conservation Biology Volume 15. No.4, August 2001 ~:.'- ;i'~ ]j