8125 - Laserfiche WebLink

Home Browse Search

34 The Mediation Process work of the parties merely by his or her presence or by minimal support of the principal negotiators (Perez, 1959; Kolb, 1983). On the other hand, if parties are in the grip of intense emotions, do not have skills or expertise in negotiations or problem-soly- ing procedures, or have reached an impasse on substantive issues, the mediator will probably be more active and more visi- ble in the negotiations. He or she may assist the parties in pro- ductively venting strong emotions, narrowing the bargaining range, creating agendas, generating and assessing options, and initiating a variety of other procedures or moves that assist the parties in reaching a settlement. Power Equality Between Disputants. In order to derive mutually satisfactory and acceptable decisions from negotia- tions, all parties must have some means of influence, either posi- tive or negative, on other disputants at the table. This is a pre- requisite for a settlement that recognizes mutual needs (Lovell, 1952). If the power or influence potentials of the parties are well developed, fairly equal in strength, and recognized by all disputants, the mediator's job will be to assist parties in using their influence effectively while producing mutually satisfactory results. If, however, influence on each other is not equal and one party has the ability to impose an unsatisfactory settlement on another, an agreement that will not hold over time, or a reso- lution that will result in renewed conflict later, the mediator will have to decide whether and how to assist the weaker party. Assistance or possible empowerment of the weaker party by the mediator requires very specific intervention moves-ac- tivities that shift the mediator's function dangerously close to advocacy. This problem in mediation has been debated among mediators (Bernard, Folger, Weingarten, and Zumeta, 1984). One argument states that a mediator has an obligation to create just settlements and must therefore help empower the under- dog to reach equitable and fair agreements (Laue and Cormick, 1978; Suskind, 1981; Haynes, 1981). Another school argues that mediators should not do anything to influence the power relations of disputing parties because it taints the intervenor's impartiality (Bellman, 1982; Stulberg, 1981b). In examining this question and how it affects the media-