Laserfiche WebLink
keep them there. <br />Moderates and Rejectionists <br />"The enduring challenge for. American en`iironmental policy, in short, is to build <br />and maintain public support for effective governance of the environment: for <br />managing the environment by managing ourselves" <br />(Andrews 1999) <br />Babbit's attempt to push a collaborative approach to demonstrate that the ESA could be <br />wielded with sensitivity and openness to local creative solutions in ways the drew people together <br />would prove to split environmentalist and commodity producer constituencies alike. <br />In the environmentalist camp, some would want the ESA to be employed as an <br />uncompromising legal hammer, not an invitation to negotiation with despoiling devils. <br />Collaboration would allow developers, industrialists, and extractive industries to construct a path <br />around tougher ESA requirements. Environmentalists had to confront their big strategic choice: <br />1. work within Babbit's framework of negotiations, which would mean making <br />compromise with coalition partners, an acceptance of certain things as given, and <br />working solutions out within the parameters established by the coalition; or <br />2. work outside the framework of negotiations, staying "pure" and being prepared to <br />challenge any given negotiated outcome in court. This means a sacrifice of local <br />knowledge that comes with getting to know your opponents and allies, and a <br />sacrifice of getting something positive done on the ground sooner rather than later, <br />if at all. <br />The question became: "When is it time for environmentalists to be divisive holdouts, and <br />when is it time to enter the fray, cut deals, and help get something done on the ground even if it is <br />not perfect?" <br />From the perspective of the environmental community, the Platte river recovery plan was a <br />new type of negotiation. Denver's Two Forks project proposal had been a case where <br />environmentalists and their allies were closely aligned-they were unequivocally against it. <br />Fighting the devil embodied in the form of a large storage project was a money raiser for them, <br />and their task was simple-oppose it forthrightly. However, in the case of Platte basin <br />negotiations, the issues were less clear-cut, and positions, depending upon constituencies and <br />organizational mission, were much more complex. Many actors with various agendas yielded no <br />clear opponent, and each interest h:ad to be considered as at least somewhat legitimate. This <br />meant the all parties had to seek a middle ground of tradeoffs and work with opponents in order to <br />accomplish anything. <br />Some environmentalists saw the FWS as too willing to compromise, thereby weakening <br />the intent of the ESA and unduly ri.sking species survival. They noted what they considered the <br />infrequency of jeopardy findings, and declared that compromise and negotiated settlements that <br />53