Organizing for Endangered and Threatened Species Habitat Draft

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venting, and angry claims of injury. Representatives of host states would demonstrate solidarity with their constituencies by "grandstanding" (Zallen 1997). Nearly every term or condition put forth was untenable to other parties, and at times the process seemed deadlocked. To many the whole effort seemed useless. But no party was willing to be the first to step away from the table. None wanted the dead body of a failed negotiation placed at its doorstep. Federal agencies were not always the "bad guys." Some of the most difficult issues were between states, and they met repeatedly without the DOI present to address inter-state problems. Negotiations were open to the public. As discussions slowly showed some signs of progress more people thought them worth attending. At times meetings were witness to large gatherings-50 to 75 people crowding into rooms designed for considerably fewer (Ring 1999). It was then agreed to break into small work groups, and reduce meeting size to about 30. Overall, the negotiations were labor and time intensive, especially because none of the parties had adequate staffing or funding to sustain their efforts. Federal and state budgets were limited, and in some cases even being reduced. Individual ranchers and farmers were at the greatest disadvantage, because they had no specialized assistance, no travel budgets and found it difficult to participate in busy spring, summer, and fall growing seasons. Constrained resources, however, created more than complaint; they also were the source of pressure to get serious and make a deal. However, representatives of the several interests knew that the price of acquiescing to a"bad deal" would be to have their head handed to them by their own constituencies. For all parties, regulatory certainty was paramount, but everyone wanted that certainty on different terms. ? Early negotiations were frequently filled with assertions to the effect that the whole effort , was futile given constraints of law, the Colorado-Nebraska interstate compact, Nebraska v. • Wyoming litigation, and the fact that small streams of water disappear quickly into the sandy river bottoms of semi-desert high plains. Old antagonisms led to charges that the program was in fact a ? conspiracy to deliver more water to irrigators in Nebraska, so they would eventually agree to share ? some of their water for habitat purposes. Some water users alleged that federal agencies were ? simple opportunists who targeted water in high mountains not because it made any sense to do so, • but-reasoning that the water was too far from the critical habitat in Nebraska to justify re- regulating-the FWS simply wanted to extort without a larger justifying plan in mind (Zallen ? 1997). Users also made the argument that Federal agencies were simply attacking state prior ? appropriations doctrine in an attempt to wrest control away from the states. Early on, Colorado used the South Platte compact as a shield from the impacts of the ESA, by holding that Colorado simply did not "owe" more water to Nebraska. Colorado asserted that merely had to deliver the amount stipulated in the compact. Other Colorado objections to the MOA included concerns that water released from high in the headwaters would never make it all the way to Nebraska habitat, but would instead be diverted by surface water users in Colorado and Wyoming, or by groundwater users in Nebraska operating entirely within state law. States were fond of pointing out that hydrological data revealing that, in periods of low flow in the basin. heavy rains creating floods in one reach of the river or a tributary may be entirely absorbed into river banks and floodplains in near downstream reaches. For example, the largest recorded flow on the South Platte main stem could not be detected as an increase in the central Platte's flow at Grand Island (Dreeszen and Bentall 1993). But, in the end, water users in each state needed federal permits and that harsh reality had brought each of them to the negotiating table and would 52