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<br />. <br /> <br />of their grant monies at the end of their 12-month programs. In most of the <br />regions where money was left over, drought-related programs often corresponded <br />closely to certain program priorities which constituted their normal flows of <br />operation. Therefore, there was a willingness to absorb many drought program <br />costs. <br /> <br />3.1.3 THE REGIONAL POLICY AND ADVISORY GROUPS <br /> <br />All but two of the regional contracts were signed by early September 1977. <br />Upon closure of the agreement process, the interface between the OSDC and the <br />regions intensified. Over the course of the year-long relationship between the <br />OSDC and the regions, numerous program initiatives flowed downward, from the <br />State to the regional level. It was during this process that certain specific <br />State programs, not having been mandated in the contractual agreements, became <br />subject to a filtration process at the regional level. That is, numerous policy <br />decisions were necessary regarding: first, whether State initiatives would be <br />carried out; and, if so, what the specific applications of these initiatives <br />would be. Also, policy decisions were necessary regarding program initiatives <br />conceived at the regional level. <br /> <br />Each. region, in accord with the terms of the MOAs, developed technical <br />advisory committees (TACs). As might be expected, the roles and character of <br />the individual TACs varied greatly. Generally, the TACs assumed three levels of <br />activity in regional policy-making: formulative and implementative, advisory, <br />and inactive. <br /> <br />3.1.3.1 The Inactive Technical Advisory Committees <br /> <br />Inactive TACs did not necessarily connote weak regional drought policy. In <br />many cases, the established regional political infrastructures (i.e., county <br />commissioners or COG Boards) played strong roles in drought-related policy <br />development. Such cases are illustrated by those situations in which some of <br />the regions attempted to utilize existing water advisory groups to undertake an <br />additional advisory role in the formulation of regional drought policy. The <br />water quality groups, which included regional water resource personnel, had been <br />organized by the State prior to the drought to implement various State- and <br />federally-mandated water quality programs. Conceptually, due to their prior and <br />ongoing involvement in water-related activities, these groups would function <br />ideally as technical advisory committees to regional drought programs The water <br />quality groups, however, proved to be generally unresponsive to drought-related <br />issues. Many of the mandated water regulations which the groups had been <br />required to address as part of their water quality activities were, in fact, <br />deemed unnecessary by the group members themselves. It is possible that the <br />groups made no distinction between the regulatory format of their water quality <br />involvement and the technical advisory format of their proposed drought roles. <br />Additionally, the resentment toward the State regarding mandated policy <br />probab ly adverse ly affected the water groups I i ncent i ve to become act i ve ly <br />involved in another State program. <br /> <br />40 <br />