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<br />t <br /> <br />~ *", 'j' e: 3 <br />'.... _.1...' .' .,'. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />of community services delivery. The intention behind the split-time contracts <br />was threefold: First, the State favored the economic advantages of resource <br />pooling; second, at least one regional administrator did not feel that the scope <br />of drought coordination needs merited an $18,000 allocation; and, finally, it <br />was felt that $9,000 was not enough money to fund a full-time position but that <br />$18,000 of "split-time" funding would substantiate a full-time coordinating <br />position. <br /> <br />, <br /> <br />Unfortunately, the "split-time" arrangements were not entirely successful. <br />OSDC and COHR administrators were not able to agree on the level of stringency <br />required in the provisions of a single contract. Most of the problems that <br />arose between the OSDC and COHR surrounded the flexible financial reporting <br />requirements which had been advocated by the State Drought Coordinator to <br />expedite the agreement process with the regions. Eventually, two separate <br />contracts were prepared and de 1 i vered to the three part i c i pat i ng regi ons. <br />Problems then arose because of the lack of simultaneity in the delivery of the <br />separate contracts: The drought contracts were signed and the monies allocated <br />three months before the COHR contracts were processed. Furthermore, two of the <br />regions opting for the "split-time" arrangement ended up rejecting the COHR <br />contract. The net result was that, while one region was able to handle its <br />drought coordination duties handily on $9,000, the two others did not begin to <br />implement any drought programs until January 1978, ostensibly because of the <br />COHR contract delay. <br /> <br />, <br /> <br />t <br /> <br />, <br /> <br />Another instance of variation in a contractual arrangement occurred with <br />one region in which local administrators did not want State "interference" to <br />begin with. The water conservancy district in the area had already established <br />some of the management activities which the State hoped to implant in the region <br />as part of its drought management strategy. For example, a "Drought Committee" <br />had been independently established in the region in early May of 1977, prior to <br />any OSDC overtures. The difficulty of implementing the State's drought program <br />in the region was compounded by a change in the region's COG administration <br />shortly after the start-up of programs in other regions. Nevertheless, an <br />extremely broad contract and memorandum of agreement were eventually negotiated <br />with the COG. The provisions of the contract allowed the "Drought Committee" as <br />originally set up in the region to sponsor and administer any programs it deemed <br />reasonable, and to supersede the role of a drought coordinator. It is notable <br />that, for the most part, the arrangement worked well. <br /> <br />Contract Terminations. Two regional contracts were terminated by the <br />State prematurely (in May 1978) basically because of inadequate performance. <br />OSDC personnel had been aware of the low levels of program activity in both <br />regions from the beginning of the project. The posture taken by the OSDC may be <br />best descri bed as one of cont i nued i ntercess i on to improve performance. A <br />combination of prodding by telephone, letters, field trips, and attempted goal <br />reorientations had not been adequate. Despite the apparent low level of drought <br />response activity in two of the regions, both spent all of their monthly <br />allocations that had been made to them by the State up to the point at which <br />their contracts were terminated. In contrast, it is notable that many of the <br />regions with strong programs were able to return to the State large percentages <br /> <br />39 <br />