2011-09-19_ENFORCEMENT - M1977300

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Second, this Court's acceptance of Cotter's jurisdictional argument would not mean that Defendants would be foreclosed from seeking a cease and desist order unless one is sought immediately upon finding a violation of the Act. To the contrary, the Board would retain jurisdiction to enter a cease and desist order within the same proceeding in which it determines a violation occurred; it may do so, however, only so long as a timely appeal from its order has not been filed, thereby removing jurisdiction to the district court. The Division and Board may not circumvent this automatic transfer of jurisdiction to the district court by purporting to initiate a "new proceeding" based upon the same facts and findings that were part of a prior proceeding from which an appeal has been taken. Colorado Anti - Discrimination Comm'n, 355 P.2d at 86. In short, the cease and desist order constitutes an amendment of the August 2010 Order, and the Board lacked jurisdiction to so amend because Cotter had perfected its appeal from the August 2010 Order. Therefore, the cease and desist order must be set aside. III. The Order Is Contrary to Law Because Neither the August 2010 Order Nor the December 2010 Order Clearly and Precisely Defines the Conduct Required to Comply. In its Opening Brief, Cotter cited Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 235 P.2d 592, 594 (Colo. 1951), for the proposition that a party may be subjected to punishment for failure to comply with an administrative or judicial order only where "the language declaring such rights or imposing burdens [is] clear, specific and unequivocal so that the parties may not be misled thereby." (Opening Brief at 20.) Defendants counter that the "void for vagueness" bar has been set much lower, and that an order must simply "provide fair warning of the conduct prohibited." (Joint Answer Brief at 29, citing People v. Shell, 148 P.3d 162, 172 (Colo. 2006).) Shell does not apply 12