My WebLink
|
Help
|
About
|
Sign Out
Home
Browse
Search
2011-05-26_ENFORCEMENT - M1977300
DRMS
>
Day Forward
>
Enforcement
>
Minerals
>
M1977300
>
2011-05-26_ENFORCEMENT - M1977300
Metadata
Thumbnails
Annotations
Entry Properties
Last modified
8/24/2016 4:33:50 PM
Creation date
8/10/2011 2:35:59 PM
Metadata
Fields
Template:
DRMS Permit Index
Permit No
M1977300
IBM Index Class Name
ENFORCEMENT
Doc Date
5/26/2011
Doc Name
Reply Brief of Plaintiff Cotter Corporation (N.S.L.)
From
Cotter Corporation
To
District Court
Email Name
DB2
Media Type
D
Archive
No
There are no annotations on this page.
Document management portal powered by Laserfiche WebLink 9 © 1998-2015
Laserfiche.
All rights reserved.
/
52
PDF
Print
Pages to print
Enter page numbers and/or page ranges separated by commas. For example, 1,3,5-12.
After downloading, print the document using a PDF reader (e.g. Adobe Reader).
View images
View plain text
(Colo. Ct. App. 2006) ( "In construing a statute and determining legislative intent, we rely on the <br />language of the statute and give the words used their plain and ordinary meaning. "). <br />Third, the Defendants' attempt to manufacture an ambiguity in section 34 -32- 124(7) is <br />unavailing. To create a purported ambiguity, the Defendants assert that Colo. Rev. Stat. <br />§ 34 -32- 124(2) authorizes the Board to issue cease and desist orders if the operator is found in <br />violation of the "Act, notice, permit, or regulation," and that less expansive language is contained <br />in section 34- 32- 124(7). Answer Brief at 62. The Defendants' assertion does not prove an <br />ambiguity in either statute. Fully aware of the difference between permits, the Act, and <br />regulations, as reflected in section 34 -32- 124(2), the legislature limited the scope of <br />section 34- 32- 124(7) to violations of a permit. The legislature took a similar approach in Colo. <br />Rev. Stat. § 34- 32- 124(6)(a), which authorizes permit suspension, modification, and revocation <br />only if "violation of a permit provision has occurred." No ambiguity therefore exists in Colo. <br />Rev. Stat. § 34 -32- 124(7). See Tatum v. Basin Resources, Inc., 141 P.3d 863, 870 -71 (Colo. Ct. <br />App. 2005) ( "Courts may not interpolate into a statute words that it does not contain, or extract a <br />meaning which is not expressed by it. "). <br />Fourth, because the language of section 34 -32- 124(7) is not "unclear or ambiguous," this <br />Court may not look beyond the words of the statute to interpretive rules of statutory construction. <br />Goodale, 78 P.3d at 1107 (rules of statutory construction not applied when statute was neither <br />unclear nor ambiguous); International Truck & Engine Corp., 155 P.3d at 642 -43; cf. Charnes v. <br />Boom, 766 P.2d 665, 667 -68 (Colo. 1988) (court applied rules of statutory construction only after <br />it found the statute was susceptible to more than one meaning). The Defendants' discussion of <br />section 34- 32 -124's title and separate subsections should therefore be disregarded. <br />37 <br />
The URL can be used to link to this page
Your browser does not support the video tag.