2011-05-26_ENFORCEMENT - M1977300

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contention, the Defendants assert initially that section 34 -32- 124(7) is "unclear or ambiguous." Answer Brief at 62. Then, citing Rule 3.3.2(2)(b), the Defendants assert that the Board has construed section 34- 32- 124(7) to authorize civil penalties for a violation of the "provisions of a permit, the Act, or these Rules." Answer Brief at 64. The Defendants' alternative contention fails for several reasons. First, in assessing civil penalties against Cotter, the Board did not rely on Rule 3.3.2(2)(b), but relied, instead, on Colo. Rev. Stat. § 34- 32- 124(7). See Order ¶ 46, AR:00852 ( "Pursuant to § 34 -32- 124(7), C.R.S., the Board may impose a civil penalty ... ). Under these circumstances, where the Board does not mention Rule 3.3.2(2)(b) in its Order or deliberations, but explicitly cites to section 34 -32- 124(7) as the basis for its authority to assess civil penalties, the Defendants' assertion that Rule 3.3.2(2)(b) here controls is not relevant and should be disregarded. Second, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 34 -32- 124(7) is not "unclear or ambiguous," as it expressly authorizes civil penalties only where a person "violates any provision of any permit issued under this article." The Defendants concede this lack of ambiguity in their Answer Brief: "[s]ection 124(7) states that the Board may impose civil penalties only for permit violations." Answer Brief at 62 (emphasis added). Had the legislature intended that civil penalties could be assessed in circumstances other than permit violations, "it could have said so plainly." See International Truck & Engine Corp., 155 P.3d at 642. This Court must therefore interpret section 34 -32- 124(7) "as written." See People v. Goodale, 78 P.3d 1103, 1107 (Colo. 2003); see also Rodriguez v. Schutt, 914 P.2d 921, 925 (Colo. 1996) ( "statute should be construed as written "); Rigmaiden v. Colorado Dep't. of Health Care Policy & Financing, 155 P.3d 498, 503 36