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Page 6 <br />504 F.3d 1007, 65 ERC 1289, 07 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,947, 2007 Daily Journal D.A.R. 15,420 <br />(Cite as: 504 F3d 1007) <br />referred to § 1288(b)(2), which provides for the de- <br />velopment of area-wide programs to eliminate exist- <br />ing pollution in the context of area-wide waste treat- <br />ment management. Id. That section provides details <br />required of any plan to eliminate the pollution, in- <br />cluding schedules, time lines, identification of agen- <br />cies, and identification of measures necessary to carry <br />out the plan. <br />The Appeals Board stated that prior Agency pro- <br />nouncements "confirm our position that, rather than <br />completely banning new source discharges, 122.46) <br />provides new sources with the opportunity to obtain a <br />permit if the requirements specified in that section are <br />met." In re Carlota Copper Co.. 11 E.A.D. 692. 765 <br />(EAB 2004). The prior Agency position quoted states: <br />A new source or new discharger may, however, <br />obtain a permit for discharge into a water segment <br />which does not meet applicable water quality stan- <br />dards by submitting information demonstrating that <br />there is sufficient loading capacity remaining in <br />waste load allocations (WLAs) for the stream seg- <br />ment to accommodate the new discharge and that <br />existing dischargers to that segment are subject to <br />compliance schedules designed to bring the segment <br />into compliance with the applicable water quality <br />standards. <br />statement illustrates the Appeals Board's er- <br />roneous view of the objective of § <br />122.4(i)(2): <br />The goal of the proposal is not, as Peti- <br />tioners and other commenters seemed to <br />believe, the restoration of the entirety of <br />Pinto Creek to water quality standards. <br />While desirable, this is not the intent of the <br />proposed action. <br />In re Carlota Copper Co.. 11 E.A.D. 692, <br />784 (EAB 2004). <br />171 The EPA has the responsibility to regulate dis- <br />charges from point sources and the states have the <br />responsibility to limit pollution coming into the waters <br />from non-point sources. If point sources, other than <br />the permitted point source, are necessary to be sche- <br />duled in.order to achieve the water quality standard, <br />then the EPA must locate any such point sources and <br />establish compliance schedules to meet the water <br />quality standard before issuing a permit. If there are <br />not adequate point sources to do so, then a permit <br />cannot be issued unless the state or Carlota agrees to <br />establish a schedule to limit pollution from a nonpoint <br />source or sources sufficient to achieve water quality <br />standards. <br />Id. (emphasis added). The language quoted by the <br />Appeals Board from the prior agency action requires <br />compliance schedules designed to bring the water <br />segment into compliance, with the applicable water <br />quality standards. <br />In Carlota's case, there are no plans or compliance <br />schedules to bring the Pinto Creek segment "into <br />compliance with applicable water quality standards," <br />as required by 122.4(i)(2), which Carlota and the <br />EPA both acknowledge is the applicable section with <br />which Carlota must comply. The error of both the <br />EPA and Carlota is that the objective of that section is <br />not simply to show a lessening of pollution, but to <br />show how the water quality standard will be met if <br />Carlota is allowed to discharge pollutants into the <br />impaired waters. €`° <br />FN2. The only step the EPA or Carlota has <br />taken to meet the requirements of § <br />122.4(i)(2) is the partial remediation of the <br />Gibson Mine discharge. The following <br />The EPA contends that it cannot be judicially com- <br />pelled to act against point sources that are illegally <br />discharging into Pinto Creek. The EPA notes that <br />while it *1015 has the authority to act against viola- <br />tors, its decision to do so in ordering its priorities is a <br />matter that is typically committed to its absolute dis- <br />cretion, citing Sierra Club v. nitman, 268 F.3d 898, <br />903 (9th Cir.2001) and Heckler v. Chanev. 470 U.S. <br />821, 831-32, 105 S.Ct. 1649.84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985). <br />In Carlota's case, there is nothing in 122.46) that <br />compels the EPA to act against point sources that are <br />violating the Clean Water Act by their discharges <br />into Pinto Creek or requiring judicial review of the <br />EPA's ordering of priorities in any failure to act. The <br />requirement of J1 22.4(i)(2) is simply a condition that <br />must be met before a permit can be issued to.a new <br />discharger into impaired waters. There is no compul- <br />sion on the EPA to act against point source violators, <br />as in Sierra Club or Heckler. The EPA remains free to <br />establish its priorities; it just cannot issue a permit to a <br />new discharger until it has complied with s <br />© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.