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Page 5 504 F.3d 1007, 65 ERC 1289,07 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,947, 2007 Daily Journal D.A.R. 15,420 (Cite as: 504 F.3d 1007) (1), there are sufficient remaining load allocations to allow for the discharge because the TMDL provides a method by which the allocations could be established to allow for the discharge. There is no contention, however, that these load allocations represent the amount of pollution that is currently discharged from the point sources and nonpoint sources, and there is no indication of any plan that will effectuate these load allocations so as to bring Pinto Creek within the water quality standards. The TMDL merely provides for the manner in which Pinto Creek could meet the water quality standards if all of the load allocations in the TMDL were met, not that there are sufficient re- maining pollutant load allocations under existing circumstances. With regard to the requirements of clause (2), the EPA argues that the requirement of "compliance schedules" pertains only to point sources for which there is a permit. This does not correspond to the plain language of clause (2), which provides "the existing discharges into that segment (of Pinto Creek] are subject to compliance schedules designed to bring the segment into compliance with applicable*1013 water quality standards." 40 C.F.R. 8 122.4(1)(2) (2000). We examine that language utilizing the definitions provided in the regulation. The term "discharge" is defined to mean "the discharge of a pollutant." 40 C.F.R. S 122.2 (2000). The term "discharge of a pol- lutant," is defined as any addition of any "pollutant" or combination of pollutants to "waters of the United States" from "any point source." Id at S 122.2(a) (emphasis added). Thus, under the plain language of the regulation, compliance schedules are not confined only to "permitted" point source discharges, but are applicable to "any" point source. The EPA contends that this would amount to a com- plete ban of the discharge of pollution to impaired waters. This is based on its misreading of the plain language of the regulation to state that the remediation has to be completed before Carlota's discharge. The plain language of clause (2) of the regulation, instead, provides that existing discharges into that segment (of the waters) are "subject to compliance schedules de- signed to bring the segment into compliance with applicable water quality standards." 40 C.F.R. 122.4(1)(2) (2000) (emphasis added). This is not a complete ban but a requirement of schedules to meet the objective of the Clean Water Act. Here the existing discharges from point sources are not subject to compliance schedules designed to bring Pinto Creek into compliance with water quality stan- dards. Thus, Carlota has not demonstrated that clause (2) of 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(1) has been met. This is the regulation upon which Carlota and the EPA rely for issuance of the permit. Initially, Carlota and the EPA contended that the first and second sentences of § 222.4(1) could be construed to apply independently, thus not requiring compliance with clauses (1) and (2) when an offset would result in a substantial net reduction of pollution to the impaired waters. The Petitioners, on the other hand, maintained that the two sentences must be read together, not in- dependently. However, the EPA subsequently asked the Appeals Board to assume, for purposes of this decision, that clauses (1) and (2) do apply. See In re Carlota Copper Co.. I 1 E.A.D. 692.766 (EAB 2004). Thus, we are concerned in this case with whether the EPA required Carlota to fulfill all of the requirements of 122.4 i , including clauses (1) and (2), in order to issue a permit to it as a new discharger. The Respondents and Carlota rely on Arkansas v. Oklahoma 503 U.S. 91, 112 S.Ct. 1046, 117 L.Ed.2d 239 1992 in support of their contentions. That case involved the issuance of a permit for a city in Arkan- sas to discharge effluent into a stream in Arkansas that entered a river that eventually flowed into Oklahoma. Oklahoma challenged the permit before the EPA, alleging that the discharge violated Oklahoma Water Quality Standards. In that case, the EPA found that the discharge would not lead to a "detectable change in water quality," which the Supreme Court held was supported by substantial evidence. Arkansas. 503 U.S. at 112. 112 S.Ct. 1046. In the opinion, the Court stated that "the parties have pointed to nothing that mandates a complete ban on discharges into a waterway that is in violation of those standards. The statute does, however, contain provisions designed to remedy ex- isting water quality violations and to allocate the burden of reducing undesirable discharges between existing sources and new sources. See, e.g. l? 313(,dd)." Id at 108. 112 S.Ct. 1046. Section 1313(d) of the Clean Water Act, referred to by the Court, is the one that *1014 provides for the establishment of water quality standards and TMDLs. The Supreme Court in Arkansas v. Oklahoma also 0 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.