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STATE OF <br />DIVISION OF MINERALS AND GEOLOGI' <br />Department of Natural Resources <br />1 31 3 Sherman SL, Koom ?15 <br />Denver, C' ~ 8020] <br />Phone: f30?I 86G-:;67 <br />FAA~13031832~h106 <br />DATE <br />T0: <br />FROM <br />RE: <br />COLOI~gDO <br />Mdy 17, 1993 <br />Lorraine Stepenske <br />James Ditlie <br />Slope Stability Analyses, 83rd Joint Venture, M-92-069 <br />pF Cpl <br />ti~_ 4 <br />rte'' <br />• ~~• <br />rB ]6 <br />Roy Romer <br />Governor <br />m¢hael B. Long <br />Division Director <br />Since there are concerns regarding the integrity of an embankment housing a <br />gas transmission pipeline that traverses a proposed sand and gravel pit <br />(the 83rd Joint Venture Pit) it was reQuested that a slope stability analysis <br />be conducted by the Division to determine whether or not the embankment, given <br />certain preset conditions, would fail to protect the pipeline. <br />Soil properties, embankment dimensions and water information (phreatic surface <br />etc.) supplied by the operator were used in the analyses. SB slope versions <br />2.0 and 3.0 were used in the evaluations. The analyses were run using the <br />Spencer method for circular shear failure planes. The forced failure mode was <br />used for the analyses. A minimum FOS at the exact location of the pipeline <br />was not determined. <br />In the first computer run a failure plane was forced across the entire width <br />of the embankment. As shown on the attached printout, the probability of this <br />event is very low because the factor of safety (FOS) is very high (15.489). <br />During the second run a failure plane was induced at, or near, the estimated <br />location of the pipeline. Again, since the FOS is high (6.206), the <br />probability of a slope failure near the pipeline is very small. Forced <br />failure planes were evaluated at shallower depths (see runs 3, 4, 5 and 6>. <br />As expected, because of the type of material in the embankment and the <br />1:1 slope, the FOS becomes smaller as the failure plane gets shallower. <br />Indicating, in my opinion, that the probability of a shallow failure along the <br />active mining side of the embankment is very high and, as a result, a failure <br />will occur. The severity of the failure will depend upon whether the operator <br />continues to excavate near the toe of the embankment during, or after, <br />sloughing events. If the sloughed material is not removed the material will <br />eventually reach its angle of repose and remain stable (assuming no severe <br />water or erosion problems). A FOS of 1.5 or above is generally accepted as <br />indicating a low probability of slope failure. The smaller the FOS the higher <br />the probability of slope failure. The FOS of runs 3, 4, 5 and 6 are 1.192, <br />1.021, 0.865 and 0.828 respectively. <br />In concl~!sion, the probability of a single slope failure causing structural <br />damage to the pipeline is very small unless mining activities continue at the <br />toe of the embankment after the pit has reached its permitted depth. Cleanup, <br />or mining, of the sloughed material at the toe of the embankment may cause the <br />embankment to fail at, or near, the pipeline. <br />/ern 7446E <br /> <br />