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Colorado. The Supreme Court found that the defendant had not obtained permission from the owner of the mineral estate, and was thereby liable for geophysical trespass to plaintiff even though defendant had obtained permission from the surface owner of the estate. In that case, the plaintiff was the holder of an unrecorded coal lease of which defendant had no knowledge. Defendant sough[ protection pursuant to the Colorado Recording statute, 38-35-109(1), since plaintiff's coal lease was unrecord- ed. The Supreme Court held that since defendant had not obtained permission from the owner of [he mineral estate, the State of Colorado, it was liable to the plaintiff even though plaintiff's coal lease was unrecorded. Frankly, in a rather strained inter- pretation, found, at page 238 of the opinion, the Court found that defendant had no rights protected pursuant to the recording statute since the defendant did not attempt or obtain permission from the owner of the mineral estate. At the time, the Colorado recording statute was merely a notice statute but was amended in 1984 to specifically provide that the recording statute is now a race-notice statute as declared in Nile Valley Fed. S & L v. Security Title, 813 P.2d 849 (Colo. App. 1991). I[ would appear the results of the Grvnbera case might be different under today's standards, however, for purposes of this order, the discussion of the Supreme Court at page 234 regarding the difficulties of separate ownership of the surface and mineral estates is impor- tant. The Supreme Court stated, at page 234 of Grvnbera, suara: "Separate ownership of the surface and mineral estates create obvious tensions in attempting to assure full use of each estate without injuring the other. The broad principle by which these tensions are to be resolved is that each owner must have due regard for the rights of the other in making use of the estate in question." The court does not declare how this broad principle is to be implemented, but at the trial court level, it appears to be implemented by lawsuits. Ascertaining the intent of the parties as required by Ferrell can be extremely difficult, if not impossible, in many cases, and particularly in light of CRS 73 38-35-109(1) regarding notice. The Supreme Court stated in Grvnber~ that the "we have described the general purposes of recording acts to include the 'protection for purchasers of real property against the risk of prior secret conveyances by the seller,' and have said that one purpose is to 'permit a purchaser to rely on the condition of title as it appears of record. "' It is extremely crucial that subsequent purchasers of real estate, or interests therein, whether surface, subsurface, water or mineral rights, be able to rely on the condition of title as it appears of record. Since each case involving a straight mineral reservation turns upon the intent of the parties at the time of execution of the deed 13