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i . excepting and reserving all mineral and mineral rights and rights to enter upon the surface of the land and extract the same. . In this case, the grantor was claiming that he had reserved the sand and gravel pursuant to this language while the grantee claimed that the sand and gravel was not reserved. The Supreme Court characterized this language as a "straight mineral reserva- tion;" in other words, just using the words "mineral" and "miner- al rights" would appear to be a straight or general reservation which would not include sand and gravel rights except under fairly strong circumstances. The court essentially concluded that, under the facts of that particular case, the reservation was in general terms and did not expressly include sand and gravel. The court then addressed two areas that the trial court could look at in determining whether or not sand and gravel is included as part of a general or straight mineral reservation being, first of all, the intent of the parties, and secondly, the character of the land and what was sought to be reserved. The Farrell case involved land totaling approximately 240 acres which the court found to be entirely covered by sand and gravel. The court found the mineral reservation was in general terms and did not expressly include sand and gravel and the court stated, on page 372, that in such circumstances ". . the cases turn upon the intent of the parties a[ the time of the execution of the deed containing the reservation . In this case, neither the reservation of Plaintiff or Plaintiff/Intervenors specifically included "sand and gravel." While Plaintiff used the words "stone," "minerals rights" and "mining rights," the Court would Find this language to be sub- stantially identical to the language used in the Ferrell case and therefore a straight mineral reservation. As such, sand and gravel rights are not included in a straight mineral reservation. This, of course, makes tremendous common sense because of the inherent difficult of subsequent purchasers of either the surface estate or the mineral estate of knowing what has been severed and what is or is not included in the mineral reservation. The difficulties inherent in severed estates is dis- cussed in GrvnberQ v. City of Northzlen, 739 P.2d 230 (Colo. 1987). That case appeared to be the first case in Colorado which recognized a tort claim and theory of recovery characterized as geophysical trespass. In that case, the Supreme Court allowed the plaintiff to pursue this claim of geophysical trespass relating to the defendant's drilling of test holes for coal on [he subject property. The plaintiff was a lessee of mineral interest from the owner of [he mineral interest, the State of 12