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12/14/04 T[JE 11:58 FAb 15124a~T711 TDW <br />Parks and Outdoor Recreation] as a defendant, the presence of the <br />Division of Parks will destroy diversity under 28 U.S.C, § 1332 <br />[footnote omitted] and will require remand of this case to the state <br />district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e). <br />If this Court were to determine that BTU Empire is correct in its analysis that <br />the joinder of the State of Colorado into this case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. <br />19 or Fed. It. Civ. P. 202 would "destroy diversity^~ and require remand to <br />2 llespite couching its November 24, 2004 motion in terms of requesting the <br />Court's permission to amend its complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), <br />BTU Empire is really seeking to join three additional parties as defendants to <br />its existing causes of action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 and/or Fed. R. Civ, <br />P. 20 -Lisa Barker, Glen Stinson and the State of Colorado. BTU Empire's <br />two causes of action and the requests for relief as stated in its original <br />complaint remain unchanged in the proposed amended complaint except to add <br />the three parties. <br />s In its memorandum, BTU Empire relies on a line of cases that holds that a <br />State is not a citizen for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kansas v. <br />Home Cable Incorporated, 34 F. Supp. 783, 785 (D. Kansas 1998) where the <br />Stato of Kansas was the only plaintiff in the case instituted in Kansas State <br />district court, and, after the Ohio defendant removed the case to federal district <br />court, the case was remanded oa the gzounds that the State of Kansas was not s <br />citizen of any State for diversity purposes, and therefore, there was no <br />diversity of citizenship between anon-citizen of all States and a citizen of <br />Ohio. The holding in the Xome Cable case is consistent with cases going back <br />more than a htmdred years. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Northern Secs. Co., 194 <br />U.S. 48 (1904); Postal Telegraph Cable Co, v. Alabama, 155 U.S. 482 (1894); <br />and Stone v. South Carolina, 117 U.S. 430 (1886). The Barkers believe that if <br />the State of Colorado were to be joined in the present case as a defendant <br />under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 and/or 20, complete diversity of citizenship would not <br />be affected as the State of Colorado would not be considered a citizen of <br />Colorado or any other State, but there would still be complete diversity of <br />citizenship between BTU Empire (a citizen of Delaware and Co]orado) and the <br />Barkers (citizens of Washington State). Even if Lisa Barker (a citizen of <br />Washington State) and Glen Stinson (a citizeq of Georgia) were to be joined as <br />defendants in this case under Fed, ]t. Civ. P. 19 and/or 20 along with the State <br />of Colorado, BTU &mpire as a citizen of Delaware and Colorado would be on <br />one side, with three citizens of Washington State, one citizen of no State and <br />one citizen of Georgia on the other lido. In other words, the Barkers disagree <br />with BT1J Empire's position that the mere addition of a State as a defendant in <br />a case that has been brought originally in, or removed to, Federal district court <br />®ooa <br />