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1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18968 <br />citizen would destroy federal jurisdiction over <br />this matter. <br />domiciliary of Kansas, as is Dr. Dobson, so <br />joinder would destroy diversity. <br />The burden of proof is on the defendants to show <br />that diversity would still exist if the joinder were <br />permitted. McNutt v. General Motors <br />Acceotance Corn. 298 U S 178. 189 (]9361 <br />(upon motion for remand, burden of proof <br />generally rests on the removing party to show <br />that diversity exists); accord Elkhart Co-on. <br />Eouity Exchange v Dav 716 F Supp 1484 <br />] 38,5 (D. Kan. 19891 Citizenship is determined <br />as of the date the complaint was initially filed. <br />See DeBrv v. Transamerica Coro.. 601 F 2d 480. <br />486 (10th Cir. 19791; Woolsey v. Petroleum <br />Production Management, Inc., No. 88-1076-C <br />(D. Kan. Oct. 17, 1989) (1989 WL 123256) <br />(citizenship determined as of date complaint <br />filed and from affidavits and sworn documents <br />submitted by parties). Once a person establishes <br />a domicile in a particular state, the domicile is <br />presumed to continue in that state, even if the <br />party leaves the state, until the adoption of a new <br />domicile ]*4] is proved. See Desmare v. United <br />States, 93 U.S. (3 Ottol 605, 610 (15761: Sun <br />Printine & Ynblishina Assn v. Edwards. 194 <br />IJ.S. 377. 383 (1904): accord Gates v. <br />Commissioner. 199 F 2d 291. 294 (10th Cir. <br />19521 (factors determining domicile include <br />where the individual pays taxes, resides, works, <br />and is registered to vote). <br />Defendants' contention that plaintiff is domiciled <br />in Arkansas is premised on an answer to an <br />interrogatory in which plaintiff listed an <br />Arkansas address as a residence. In response, <br />plaintiff has submitted an affidavit indicating <br />that she does not intend to stay in Arkansas <br />permanently. She maintains that she is only <br />living in Arkansas now to receive medical care <br />for her blindness, a condition allegedly caused <br />by defendants. (See Doc. # 22, Exh. I). <br />Defendants' alleged proof of plaintiffs domicile <br />consists only of her admission that she has lived <br />at an address outside of Kansas. The same <br />interrogatory answer on which defendants rely, <br />however, also states that plaintiff lived in <br />Kansas for 19 years. Merely residing in another <br />state does not amount to a change in plaintiffs <br />legal state of domicile, absent an intent ]*5] to <br />remain there permanently. Gates v. <br />Commissioner. 199 F 2d 291. 294 110th Cir <br />19521. <br />Defendants, therefore, have not me[ their burden <br />of proving that diversity would be maintained if <br />Dr. Dobson were joined. Plaintiff is a <br />A relatively new federal statute governs joinder <br />and remand claims in situations such as this. <br />Under 28 U.S.C. & 1447(e), "If after removal the <br />plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants <br />whose joinder would destroy subject matter <br />jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or <br />permit joinder and remand [he action to the State <br />court." 2S U.S.C_S. 6 1447(e) (Law. Co-op. <br />1989). When this section was added in 1988, <br />Congress explained: <br />Proposed section 1447(e) is new. I[ takes <br />advantage of the opportunity opened by removal <br />from a state court to permit remand if a plaintiff <br />seeks to join a diversity-destroying defendant <br />after removal. Joinder coupled with remand may <br />be more attractive than either dismissal under <br />civil rule I9(b) or denial of joinder. The <br />flexibility built into the framework of rule 19(b) <br />fully supports this approach... . <br />H.R. Rep. No. 889, 100th Cong., ~*6j 2d Sess., <br />reprinted in 1988 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. <br />News 5982, 6033. <br />Instead of emphasizing the indispensability <br />analysis under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b) in <br />determining whether to allow joinder and <br />remand, courts now focus on whether joinder <br />would be "equitable." S[. Louis Trade Diverters, <br />Inc. v. Constitution State Insurance Co., 738 F. <br />Supp. 1269, 1271 (E.D. Mo. 1990E In this cast, <br />the interests of justice require a remand so that <br />all of the issues can be tried together. Forcing <br />the parties to litigate the case in federal court <br />without Dr. Dobson would result in piecemeal <br />litigation. In order to obtain full recovery for her <br />alleged injuries, plaintiff would [hen have to sue <br />Dr. Dobson in state court, resulting in the dual <br />litigation of essentially the same issues. <br />The issues presented in this case were recently. <br />addressed by a federal court in New York. In <br />Wilson v Famatax. [nc. 72G F. Suop. 950 <br />IS.D.N.Y. 19891. the plaintiffs filed a products <br />liability action in state court. After the case was <br />removed to federal court, plaintiffs moved to <br />join an allegedly negligent treating physician as <br />a defendant. The court held that the plaintiffs <br />could join the I*7] defendant and amend their <br />complaint, even though it would destroy <br />diversity. The court allowed joinder and <br />remanded the case to state court under 2S U.S.C. <br />§ ]447(e) in order to improve judicial economy <br />Page 2 <br />