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1989-10-10_REVISION - M1988112 (35)
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1989-10-10_REVISION - M1988112 (35)
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Last modified
6/19/2021 7:26:58 AM
Creation date
11/21/2007 11:10:33 PM
Metadata
Fields
Template:
DRMS Permit Index
Permit No
M1988112
IBM Index Class Name
REVISION
Doc Date
10/10/1989
Doc Name
MEMO MLRB CONTINUING JURISDICTION DURING PENDENCY OF JUDICIAL APPEAL
From
PARCEL MAURO HULTIN & SPAANSTRA PC
Type & Sequence
AM1
Media Type
D
Archive
No
Tags
DRMS Re-OCR
Description:
Signifies Re-OCR Process Performed
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<br />An exception to the general rule of continuing <br />jurisdiction is reflected in a line of Colorado cases which <br />expressly limit the authority of an agency to change, alter or <br />vacate an order while review proceedings are pending in the <br />district court. See Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. <br />Continental Airlines. Inc., 355 P.2d 83 (Colo. 1960;; Marr v. <br />Colorado Dept. of Revenue, 598 P.2d (1955) (Colo.A:pp. 1979); <br />O'Brvant v. Public Utilities Comm., XIII Brief Times Reptr. 853 <br />(Colo. 7-17-89). While these cases limit the authority of an <br />agency to modify an order in certain specific instances, they do <br />not prohibit all agency action on an existing permit while the <br />order approving such permit is subject to pending judicial review <br />proceedings. Such an interpretation would conflict with the <br />general rule stated above that the court constitutionally lacks <br />authority to enjoin an agency in the exercise of its statutory <br />authority. Rather, Continental Airlines, Marr, anc9 O'Brvant <br />provide a narrow exception to the general rule applicab:,e when the <br />agency's exercise of its statutory authority directly conflicts <br />with the court's jurisdiction to determine issues which are subject <br />to a pending judicial review action. A review of the cases and <br />their factual and procedural histories clearly de~.fines the <br />appropriate limits to this exception. <br />In Continental Airlines, supra, the agency order sought <br />to correct unfair employment practices by Continental. The <br />district court remanded the orders to the Commission with specific <br />instructions for the Commission to make limited findings of fact. <br />However, because the district court had also ruled that there was <br />a procedural defect in the original orders, the Commission sought <br />to withdraw the original orders and substitute revised orders. In <br />making the revised orders the Commission neither gave notice to <br />either party nor conducted a hearing. Accordingly, the <br />Commission's action deprived Continental Airlines of a defense to <br />the original orders and also injected new facts which Continental <br />Airlines had not had the opportunity to challenge at an agency <br />level. For these reasons the district court held that the new <br />orders were a nullity and the Supreme Court affirmed. <br />In affirming the lower court order, the Supreme Court <br />used broad language in limiting the Agency's authority over an <br />order once judicial review proceedings had been initiated. The <br />court stated that "an administrative agency is without authority <br />to change, alter or vacate an order while review proceedings are <br />pending in the district court, even as an inferior court is without <br />authority to vacate or modify a judgment after writ of error has <br />issued out of this Court directed to such judgment." Colorado <br />Anti-Discrimination Commission v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 355 <br />P.2d at 86 (Colo. 1960). The Supreme Court was compelled to use <br />this extremely broad language due to a provision found in <br />Colorado's Anti-Discrimination Act which provides that the <br />"jurisdiction of the [reviewing] court shall be exclusive and its <br />judgment and order shall be final, subject to review by the Supreme <br />5 <br />
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