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"~. • • WELBORN, DUFFORD 8 BROWN Mr. David C. Shelton April 24, 1984 Page 3 merely demonstrates that the Act and regulations do not foreclose the operator from making a subsequent request, nor the Division from granting it under appropriate circumstances. Section 123(8)(1) and Rule 5.04.6(3) do not preclude this interpretation either, since the penalties called for by each of them are to commence at the conclusion of the abatement period, without regard to whether the initial period was extended before or after expiration of the period initially set. As to the second point, my letter of April 17 explained the three categories of "good cause" to be considered in connection with determining the validity of a cessation order under Section 123(3) as well as in determining whether to vacate an order under Section 123(5). Those same categories should be considered in determining what constitutes a "reasonable time" for abatement and "good cause" for an extension, regardless of whether the request is made before or after the initial abatement period has passed. In addition, these issues should be reviewed in light of the purposes of the Act to prevent, mitigate and correct adverse effects on the environment from surface coal mining operations. Finally, Blue Ribbon sees little, if any, difference in this context between the concepts of reasonableness and good cause. Even if there is a difference, showing that an extension constitutes a reasonable abatement time should be a sufficient showing of good cause for the extension. Blue Ribbon submits that under all of the circumstances of this case, an extension of the abatement period to March 29, 1984, which it has requested in writing with good cause, constitutes a reasonable abatement period. The key issue is Blue Ribbon's attitude toward compliance. The other factors meet the reasonableness and good cause criteria without question. The ninety-day limit on abatement did not expire until well after March 29. There were no additional or different adverse environmental impacts as a result of the NOV through that time. As to the operator attitude question, the "reason- ableness" of the abatement period and the "good cause" required for an extension merge in this case into the question of whether there is substantial justification to deny the extension because of indifference or recalcitrance with regard to the compliance. Absent defiance or other aggravating operator responses in the particular case, none of which were present here, the analysis on this issue should take into