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<br />David Berry - 5 - April 7, 1998 <br />developed the area adjacent to the 3'd west mains because Bear <br />could hear MCC's continuous miner(s) from the Bear No. 3 Mine. <br />MCC personnel informed Bear that MCC was storing water in <br />sumps near where Bear noted the seeps. Dan Bear was satisfied <br />that there was no immediate safety concern because the water was <br />being stored in operational sumps. <br />Meeting 2: Attendees: BCC -Dan Bear and Basil Bear; MCC -Phil Schmidt. <br />Time Frame: March 1996. <br />Phil Schmidt called this informational meeting to explain that MCC <br />had hit a fault that was producing about 600 gpm. Mr. Schmidt <br />informed Bear that MCC was diverting part of this water to the area <br />behind the No. 3 Mine (NW Sealed Sump). Mr. Schmidt informed <br />Bear that MCC had the capacity to pump some of the water up the <br />ramps to the surface but the pumps could not handle all of the flow. <br />Mr. Schmidt gave Bear a MCC mine map which shows the location <br />where the fault was encountered and includes a hand written <br />notation of the estimated 600 gpm flow. <br />Meeting 3: Attendees: BCC -Basil Bear; MCC -Kathy Welt, Christine <br />Johnston and a MCC consultant. Time Frame: Last half 1996. <br />The meeting was called by MCC to get Bears opinion regarding <br />water flow into and through the Bear Mine. MCC was drafting its <br />PHC. Basil presented the assumption that water would not <br />discharge from the Bear No. 3 Mine portals because of the dam <br />provided by the ramps between the C and B Seams. <br />Sincerely, <br />' J. E. Stover P.E. <br />Consulting Engineer <br />cc: Bear Coal Company <br />