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DISCUSSION C.R.S. §34-32.5-110(5)(a) expressly states that "[a]ny operator conducting an operation under a permit issued under this section [Section 110 permit] who has held the permit for two consecutive years or more and who subsequently desires to expand it to a size in excess of the limitation set forth in subsection (1) of this section may request the conversion of the permit...." (emphasis added). Under that plain statutory language, and under the well- established principles of statutory construction discussed below, the Applicant is not eligible to request conversion of its 110 Permit to a 112 Permit until it has operated the Gravel Pit for a minimum of two years - in other words, the Applicant cannot make that request and initiate the review process until September 10, 2006, at the earliest. The Board must give effect to the intent of the legislature. State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493 (Colo. 2000). That intent is determined by examining the plain language of the statute. Colorado Water Conservation Bd. v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist., 109 P.3d 585, 593 (Colo. 2005)(quoting Pierson v. Black Canyon Aggregates, Inc., 48 P.3d 1215, 1218-] 9 (Colo. 2002))("[I]f courts can give effect to the ordinary meaning of the words adopted by a legislative body, the statute should be construed as written since it may be presumed that the General Assembly meant what it clearly said."). In this case, the plain language of C.R.S. §34- 32.5-I10(5)(a) authorizes only those gravel pit operators who have held permits for over two years to request conversions. The statute clearly applies to a~ operator, not just the original permittee. Any operator, including a successor operator, who has held a permit for less than two years is not even eligible under the statute to apply for a conversion. Had the legislature intended to allow a successor operator to piggy-back on the tenn of the prior operator's permit, it could have done so. It did not. Therefore, C.R.S. §34-32.5-110(5)(a) applies to a~ operator, including successor operators like the Applicant. Likewise, when a statute specifies certain situations in which it is to apply, it must be construed to exclude all other situations not specified. Holliday v. Bestop, Inc., 23 P.3d 700, 706 n. 5 (Colo. 2001) (recognizing the rule of statutory construction "expression unius est exclusion alterius," the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of the other); Beeghly v. Mack, 20 P.3d 610, 613 (Colo. 2001); Holdridge v. Bd. ofEduc., 881 P.2d 448, 450 (Colo. App. 1994}. By expressly not articulating any exceptions to the requirement that a permittee operate in compliance with its permit for two years before applying for a permit conversion (i.e., excluding successor operators from that requirement), the General Assembly clearly intended that successor operators not be so excluded. Any other interpretation of the statutory provision reads additional language into the Act, which is impermissible. At the June 14, 2006 Board meeting, the DMG argued that, because Rule 1.11.2 states that "the original Permittee cannot convert a Permit unless the permit has been in existence for 2 consecutive years," C.R.S. §34-32.5-110(5)(a) is not inconsistent with the Act. Read in conjunction with C.R.S. §34-32.5-110(5)(a), that is true. The Rule simply confirms that the original holder of a permit cannot convert it until it has been in existence for at least two years. It does not state, as the DMG appears to argue, chat a successor operator is eligible to convert a permit if it holds such permit for a lesser period of time even though the original permittee held it for two consecutive years. Indeed, the Rule is silent in that regard. In addition, by its plain ~~~ne - ozvasoioooom - ssvzn . ~ 3