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Moreover, such an illogical interpretation need be given no deference by this <br />Court. Lobato v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 105 P.3d at 223; Washington <br />County Bd. of Equalization v. Petron Development Co., 109 P.3d at 150. <br />The City admits that the Applicant is not required to have already obtained <br />local land use permits, but, under the plain and unambiguous provisions cited <br />above, the Applicant is required to have 1) pursuant to C.M.R. 1.4.1(5)(d), already <br />applied for such permits and 2) pursuant to C.M.R 6.4.13, to have identified, with <br />more than an equivocal "if' the several specific land use approvals the County will <br />require. Here, Applicant did neither, and the MLRB's grant of the Permit with <br />these obvious holes in the Application amounts to the approval of an incomplete <br />application in violation of C.R.S. § 34-32.5-115(4)(a) as well as the approval of an <br />application that is contrary to the local permits, licenses, and approvals required by <br />Gilpin County in violation of C.R.S. § 34-32.5-115(4)(d). <br />Moreover, even if viewed as a factual determination, the evidence relied on <br />by the MLRB purporting to explain the legislative intent to separate the two <br />processes falls far short of the "substantial evidence" needed under C.R.S. § 24-4- <br />106(7) and the standards articulated in C Bar H, Inc. v Board of Health in and for <br />Jefferson County, 56 P.3d at 1192, and Lassner v. Civil Service Comm'n, 177 Colo. <br />at 259, 493 P.2d at 1098. As such, the district court's Amended Order affirming <br />24 <br />