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R. 3270, Tr. 393:15-25. Contrary to the foregoing exchange, there was no <br />testimony or other evidence in which the Applicant defined the local permits it <br />would seek, and the testimony of Steve Brown, rather than confirming that the <br />Applicant had complied with the Rules, instead, as referenced earlier, explained <br />the Board's position about the 1988 "decoupling" and the Board's lack of <br />"statutory jurisdiction" to require local permits. R. 3240, Tr. 363:24-364:4; 364:15- <br />19. <br />While the City agrees that the processes of local land use approval and <br />reclamation permitting aze sepazate, the Reclamation Act at C.R.S. § 34-32.5- <br />115(4)(d) still requires, even after the 1988 amendments, that the `proposed" <br />activities not be contrary to local requirements "applicable to the specific <br />operation." Thus, the statute still contemplates that the Board will review and <br />consider local permitting issues before a Section 112 Reclamation Permit has been <br />granted. Similarly, the Rules currently contain at C.M.R. 1,4.1(5)(d) and C.M.R. <br />6.4.13 provisions requiring applicants to seek and identify local land use approvals <br />as part of the application process and before the grant of a permit. <br />The MLRB's proffered interpretation vitiating these requirements is simply <br />contrary to the plain language of the Reclamation Act and the Rules and cannot be <br />upheld. Sooper Credit Union v. Sholar Group Architects, P.C., 113 P.3d at 771. <br />23 <br />