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Sholar Group Architects, P.C., 113 P.3d at 771; In re Marriage of Chalat, 112 <br />P.3d at 54. <br />Here, the MLRB endorsed the Applicant's interpretation of the Rules and <br />Reclamation Act that entirely vitiates the requirements of C.M.R. 1.4.1(5)(d) and <br />disregards C.R.S. § 34-32.5-115(4)(d). Rather than requiring compliance with the <br />plain language of C.M.R. 1.4.1(5)(d) and insisting on the Applicant making an <br />affirmative statement that the "Applicant has applied for all necessary approvals <br />from local government," the MLRB considered the Applicant's vague stipulation <br />with Gilpin County (the "Stipulation"), which was precisely stated as follows by <br />counsel for the Applicant, to fulfill C.M.R. 1.4.1(5)(d): <br />The applicant has agreed to the language in this <br />stipulation that says that the applicant will seek all <br />necessary county permits or approvals. <br />R. 2906, Tr. 29:13-16. The MLRB's February 1, 2006, Order relies on and <br />incorporates the language of the Stipulation as follows: <br />Notably, the Applicant entered into a stipulation with <br />Gilpin County prior to the Board hearing which obligates <br />the Applicant to seek all necessary permits and approvals <br />from Gilpin County. <br />Record, p. 2687, Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Order, at p. 17. <br />This Stipulation fails to satisfy the Rules as a matter of law for at least two <br />reasons. First, the language of the Stipulation is executory, "the applicant will <br />is <br />