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County. Thus, under C.R.S. § 34-32.5-115(4)(d), the Applicant is required to show <br />compliance with any Gilpin County regulations that apply to the specific gravel <br />mining operation for which Applicant seeks a Section 112 Reclamation Permit. <br />Yet, it is undisputed that Applicant has not applied for any permits, licenses, <br />or approvals from Gilpin County, and the Applicant has steadfastly refused to <br />acknowledge the permits that the County has openly stated it will require. This <br />failure renders the Application incomplete under C.R.S. § 34-32.5-115(4)(a); and, <br />perhaps more significantly, it also constitutes another basis on which this Court <br />may reverse MLRB's grant of the Permit. This Court may overturn the MLRB's <br />incorrect interpretation of its own statutory and rule-made requirements. C Bar H, <br />Inc. v. Board of Health in and for Jefferson County, 56 P.3d at 1192. <br />In approving the Application without the required information on local <br />permitting, the MLRB rendered meaningless C.R.S. § 34-32.5-115(4)(d), C.M.R. <br />1.4.1(5)(d), and C.M.R. 6.4.13 in violation of generally accepted concepts of <br />statutory construction repeatedly and consistently articulated by the Colorado <br />Supreme Court: If the statute is clear and unambiguous, it must be "unreservedly" <br />applied as written because a court must assume the General Assembly meant what <br />it wrote and must give full meaning to those words. Sooper Credit Union v. <br /> <br />