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<br />Federal Register /Vol. EE, No. 11 /Wednesday,' January 17, ?001 /Rules and Regulations 4555 <br />equipment. As indicated, the NMA <br />court made it clear that regulable <br />redeposits could be associated with <br />such activities and, to the extent that <br />they were, the NN1A decision did not <br />preclude regulation. Today's rule <br />explicitly excludes incidental fallback <br />from the definition of discharge of <br />dredged material. First, it does not alter <br />the May 10, 1999, amendment to the <br />definition of "discharge of dredged <br />material," which explicitly excluded <br />incidental fallback from the definition. <br />In addition, today's rule provides for the <br />consideration ofproject-specific <br />evidence which shows that only <br />incidental fallback results from the <br />activity. Thus, we have taken the <br />necessary steps to ensure that we do not <br />regulate "incidental fallback" when it is <br />the only material redeposited during <br />certain removal activities. The Court's <br />NAHB Motion Decision found our May <br />10, 1999, amendment consistent with <br />the injunction in the NMA case, and <br />today's rule does not change or alter the <br />underlying provisions of that rule. <br />Nevertheless, several commenters <br />have argued that the agencies are <br />interpreting "incidental fallback" too <br />narrowly and have not heeded language <br />in the Court's NAHB Motion Decision <br />that cautioned against applying a too <br />narrow definition of incidental fallback <br />that would be inconsistent with an <br />objective and good faith reading of the <br />AMC and NMA decisions. Today's rule, <br />however, is entirely consistent with that <br />order and the decisions in AMC and <br />NMA. Firs[, commenters are incorrect <br />that we have construed the meaning of <br />"incidental fallback" too narrowly <br />because, in formulating the definition in <br />today's regulation, we were guided by <br />the descriptions of incidental fallback in <br />the judicial opinions. The NMA <br />decision indicates that incidental <br />fallback " • • returns dredged <br />material virtually to the spot from <br />which it came." 145 F. 3d at 1403. it <br />also describes incidental fallback as <br />occurring "when redeposit takes place <br />in substantially the same spot as the <br />initial removal." 145 F. 3d at 1401. <br />Similarly, the District Court described <br />incidental fallback as "the incidental <br />soil movement from excavation, such as <br />the soil that is disturbed when dirt is <br />shoveled, or the back-spill that comes <br />off a bucket and Falls back into the same <br />place from which i[ was removed." 951 <br />F. Supp. at 270. We believe that <br />adopting a definition that relies heavily <br />on the judicial formulations of <br />"incidental fallback" will ensure <br />consistency with those opinions as well <br />as help project proponents understand <br />the agencies' view of "incidental <br />fallback." We disagree strongly with <br />commenters who suggested that we are <br />trying to inappropriately parse the <br />language of the AMC and NMA <br />decisions, and believe that our <br />definition of "incidental fallback" is <br />based upon a good faith interpretation <br />of those rulings. See section II C of <br />today's preamble for additional <br />discussion of this issue. <br />Nevertheless, as discussed in section <br />IiI E of today's preamble, we did not <br />adopt a definition of incidental fallback <br />that would turn on whether the material <br />was redeposited to "the same general <br />area" from which it was removed. We <br />believe this formulation could <br />potentially be read to mean that <br />incidental fallback would include any <br />dredged material redeposited in the <br />same overall site where excavation <br />occurred, as opposed to the place of <br />initial removal. We believe such a broad <br />formulation would not adequately <br />recognize court decisions that have <br />found a regulable discharge where <br />redeposits have occurred even though <br />only a short distance from the removal <br />point. See, e.g., Denton, Mango, etc. <br />Moreover, contrary to one <br />commenter's contentions, today's rule is <br />no[ inconsistent with the approach <br />taken by [he agencies in the 1997 <br />Tulloch Guidance ("Corps of Engineers/ <br />Environmental Protection Agency <br />Guidance Regarding Regulation of <br />Certain Activities in Light of American <br />Mining Congress v. Corps of Engineers," <br />April 11, 1997) ("1997 Guidance"). The <br />commenter pointed to language in the <br />1997 Guidance stating [hat if there is <br />"movement of substantial amounts of <br />dredged material from one location to <br />another in waters of the United States <br />(i.e., the material does not merely fall <br />back at the point of excavation), then <br />the regulation of that activity is not <br />affected by the Court's decision." <br />Pointing to that language, the <br />commenter went on to assert the 1997 <br />Guidance meant that unless "substantial <br />amounts" of dredged material were <br />moved, then no discharge occurs, and <br />concluded from this that the proposed <br />rule was inconsistent with the 1997 <br />Guidance. In response, we do not <br />believe the 1997 Guidance can be <br />properly read to support the <br />commenter's conclusions. The language <br />quoted by the commenter comes from a <br />portion of the guidance under the <br />section header "Types of Discharge Not <br />Addressed by Court Decision." In <br />addition, it simply provides guidance to <br />field personnel that where an activity <br />results in movement of substantial <br />volumes of dredged material, regulation <br />of the activity is unaffected by the <br />court's decision. The 1997 Guidance <br />thus does not mean we interpreted the <br />AMC or NA1A decisions to allow <br />regulation only if relocation of <br />substantial amounts of dredged material <br />takes place. In fact, the 1997 Guidance <br />provides a[ page 3 [hat: "The Court's <br />decision only has implications for a <br />particular subset of discharges of <br />dredged material, i.e., those activities <br />where the only discharges to waters of <br />the U.S. are the relativelysmoll volume <br />discharges described by the Court as <br />"incidental fallback' "' (emphasis <br />added). Nothing in today's rule is <br />inconsistent with the 1997 Guidance. <br />The preamble to the proposed rule <br />clearly recognized that there can be <br />situations where due to [he nature of the <br />equipment used and its method of <br />operation, a redeposit may consist of <br />material limited to "incidental <br />fallback." In addition, that preamble <br />recognized (as do the regulations at 33 <br />CFR 323.2(d)(2)(ii) and 40 CFR 232.2), <br />for example, that the use of equipment <br />to cut trees above the roots that does not <br />disturb the root system would not <br />involve a discharge. Moreover, as <br />discussed in section ii C of today's <br />preamble, we have modified today's <br />final rule to make it even more cleaz that <br />project-specific information maybe <br />used to demonstrate that only <br />"incidental fallback" will result. Despite <br />the discussion in the proposed rule's <br />preamble, some commenters contended <br />that we were overreaching. We believe <br />that the language changes reflected in <br />today's rule as well as the discussion in <br />today's preamble clarify that redeposits <br />associated with the use of mechanized <br />earth-moving equipment will only be <br />regulated if more than incidental <br />fallback is involved, while making clear <br />our view that activities involving <br />mechanized earth-moving equipment <br />typically result in more than incidental <br />fallback. Where the redeposits are <br />limited to incidental fallback, they <br />would not be regulated. <br />c. Covers same activities as 1993 <br />Tulloch Rule. A number of commenters <br />argued that the proposed rule was an <br />improper attempt to circumvent the <br />NMA decisions and reinstate the <br />invalidated 1993 Tulloch Rule. They <br />contended that the agencies relied on no <br />new information in developing this rule <br />and that large segments of the proposed <br />rule appeared in, and were used to <br />justify, the 1993 Rule. Moreover, as <br />opposed [o narrowing the definition of <br />"discharge of dredged material" as <br />instructed by the courts, several argued <br />that the proposed rule simply swept in <br />the same activities and created a vague <br />and impossible standard for rebutting <br />the presumption. Several asserted [hat <br />the agencies made no attempt to create <br />