<br />Federal Register /Vol. EE, No. 11 /Wednesday,' January 17, ?001 /Rules and Regulations 4555
<br />equipment. As indicated, the NMA
<br />court made it clear that regulable
<br />redeposits could be associated with
<br />such activities and, to the extent that
<br />they were, the NN1A decision did not
<br />preclude regulation. Today's rule
<br />explicitly excludes incidental fallback
<br />from the definition of discharge of
<br />dredged material. First, it does not alter
<br />the May 10, 1999, amendment to the
<br />definition of "discharge of dredged
<br />material," which explicitly excluded
<br />incidental fallback from the definition.
<br />In addition, today's rule provides for the
<br />consideration ofproject-specific
<br />evidence which shows that only
<br />incidental fallback results from the
<br />activity. Thus, we have taken the
<br />necessary steps to ensure that we do not
<br />regulate "incidental fallback" when it is
<br />the only material redeposited during
<br />certain removal activities. The Court's
<br />NAHB Motion Decision found our May
<br />10, 1999, amendment consistent with
<br />the injunction in the NMA case, and
<br />today's rule does not change or alter the
<br />underlying provisions of that rule.
<br />Nevertheless, several commenters
<br />have argued that the agencies are
<br />interpreting "incidental fallback" too
<br />narrowly and have not heeded language
<br />in the Court's NAHB Motion Decision
<br />that cautioned against applying a too
<br />narrow definition of incidental fallback
<br />that would be inconsistent with an
<br />objective and good faith reading of the
<br />AMC and NMA decisions. Today's rule,
<br />however, is entirely consistent with that
<br />order and the decisions in AMC and
<br />NMA. Firs[, commenters are incorrect
<br />that we have construed the meaning of
<br />"incidental fallback" too narrowly
<br />because, in formulating the definition in
<br />today's regulation, we were guided by
<br />the descriptions of incidental fallback in
<br />the judicial opinions. The NMA
<br />decision indicates that incidental
<br />fallback " • • returns dredged
<br />material virtually to the spot from
<br />which it came." 145 F. 3d at 1403. it
<br />also describes incidental fallback as
<br />occurring "when redeposit takes place
<br />in substantially the same spot as the
<br />initial removal." 145 F. 3d at 1401.
<br />Similarly, the District Court described
<br />incidental fallback as "the incidental
<br />soil movement from excavation, such as
<br />the soil that is disturbed when dirt is
<br />shoveled, or the back-spill that comes
<br />off a bucket and Falls back into the same
<br />place from which i[ was removed." 951
<br />F. Supp. at 270. We believe that
<br />adopting a definition that relies heavily
<br />on the judicial formulations of
<br />"incidental fallback" will ensure
<br />consistency with those opinions as well
<br />as help project proponents understand
<br />the agencies' view of "incidental
<br />fallback." We disagree strongly with
<br />commenters who suggested that we are
<br />trying to inappropriately parse the
<br />language of the AMC and NMA
<br />decisions, and believe that our
<br />definition of "incidental fallback" is
<br />based upon a good faith interpretation
<br />of those rulings. See section II C of
<br />today's preamble for additional
<br />discussion of this issue.
<br />Nevertheless, as discussed in section
<br />IiI E of today's preamble, we did not
<br />adopt a definition of incidental fallback
<br />that would turn on whether the material
<br />was redeposited to "the same general
<br />area" from which it was removed. We
<br />believe this formulation could
<br />potentially be read to mean that
<br />incidental fallback would include any
<br />dredged material redeposited in the
<br />same overall site where excavation
<br />occurred, as opposed to the place of
<br />initial removal. We believe such a broad
<br />formulation would not adequately
<br />recognize court decisions that have
<br />found a regulable discharge where
<br />redeposits have occurred even though
<br />only a short distance from the removal
<br />point. See, e.g., Denton, Mango, etc.
<br />Moreover, contrary to one
<br />commenter's contentions, today's rule is
<br />no[ inconsistent with the approach
<br />taken by [he agencies in the 1997
<br />Tulloch Guidance ("Corps of Engineers/
<br />Environmental Protection Agency
<br />Guidance Regarding Regulation of
<br />Certain Activities in Light of American
<br />Mining Congress v. Corps of Engineers,"
<br />April 11, 1997) ("1997 Guidance"). The
<br />commenter pointed to language in the
<br />1997 Guidance stating [hat if there is
<br />"movement of substantial amounts of
<br />dredged material from one location to
<br />another in waters of the United States
<br />(i.e., the material does not merely fall
<br />back at the point of excavation), then
<br />the regulation of that activity is not
<br />affected by the Court's decision."
<br />Pointing to that language, the
<br />commenter went on to assert the 1997
<br />Guidance meant that unless "substantial
<br />amounts" of dredged material were
<br />moved, then no discharge occurs, and
<br />concluded from this that the proposed
<br />rule was inconsistent with the 1997
<br />Guidance. In response, we do not
<br />believe the 1997 Guidance can be
<br />properly read to support the
<br />commenter's conclusions. The language
<br />quoted by the commenter comes from a
<br />portion of the guidance under the
<br />section header "Types of Discharge Not
<br />Addressed by Court Decision." In
<br />addition, it simply provides guidance to
<br />field personnel that where an activity
<br />results in movement of substantial
<br />volumes of dredged material, regulation
<br />of the activity is unaffected by the
<br />court's decision. The 1997 Guidance
<br />thus does not mean we interpreted the
<br />AMC or NA1A decisions to allow
<br />regulation only if relocation of
<br />substantial amounts of dredged material
<br />takes place. In fact, the 1997 Guidance
<br />provides a[ page 3 [hat: "The Court's
<br />decision only has implications for a
<br />particular subset of discharges of
<br />dredged material, i.e., those activities
<br />where the only discharges to waters of
<br />the U.S. are the relativelysmoll volume
<br />discharges described by the Court as
<br />"incidental fallback' "' (emphasis
<br />added). Nothing in today's rule is
<br />inconsistent with the 1997 Guidance.
<br />The preamble to the proposed rule
<br />clearly recognized that there can be
<br />situations where due to [he nature of the
<br />equipment used and its method of
<br />operation, a redeposit may consist of
<br />material limited to "incidental
<br />fallback." In addition, that preamble
<br />recognized (as do the regulations at 33
<br />CFR 323.2(d)(2)(ii) and 40 CFR 232.2),
<br />for example, that the use of equipment
<br />to cut trees above the roots that does not
<br />disturb the root system would not
<br />involve a discharge. Moreover, as
<br />discussed in section ii C of today's
<br />preamble, we have modified today's
<br />final rule to make it even more cleaz that
<br />project-specific information maybe
<br />used to demonstrate that only
<br />"incidental fallback" will result. Despite
<br />the discussion in the proposed rule's
<br />preamble, some commenters contended
<br />that we were overreaching. We believe
<br />that the language changes reflected in
<br />today's rule as well as the discussion in
<br />today's preamble clarify that redeposits
<br />associated with the use of mechanized
<br />earth-moving equipment will only be
<br />regulated if more than incidental
<br />fallback is involved, while making clear
<br />our view that activities involving
<br />mechanized earth-moving equipment
<br />typically result in more than incidental
<br />fallback. Where the redeposits are
<br />limited to incidental fallback, they
<br />would not be regulated.
<br />c. Covers same activities as 1993
<br />Tulloch Rule. A number of commenters
<br />argued that the proposed rule was an
<br />improper attempt to circumvent the
<br />NMA decisions and reinstate the
<br />invalidated 1993 Tulloch Rule. They
<br />contended that the agencies relied on no
<br />new information in developing this rule
<br />and that large segments of the proposed
<br />rule appeared in, and were used to
<br />justify, the 1993 Rule. Moreover, as
<br />opposed [o narrowing the definition of
<br />"discharge of dredged material" as
<br />instructed by the courts, several argued
<br />that the proposed rule simply swept in
<br />the same activities and created a vague
<br />and impossible standard for rebutting
<br />the presumption. Several asserted [hat
<br />the agencies made no attempt to create
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