Laserfiche WebLink
the challenger retained the burden to prove otherwise. Scott, 672 <br /> P.2d at 227. It then performed the due process analysis outlined in <br /> Caperton, ultimately denying NLGC's claims. <br /> Before engaging in that analysis, however, the court dismissed <br /> (in a footnote) defendants' threshold contention that campaign <br /> contributions, as a matter of law, do not constitute a "direct, <br /> personal, substantial, pecuniary interest" for conflict-of-interest <br /> purposes. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (2000). In other <br /> words, defendants argued that campaign contributions cannot bias <br /> an elected official serving in a quasi-judicial capacity, and that a <br /> Caperton-style analysis was therefore inappropriate in the first <br /> place. <br /> 46 Although the bulk of their arguments on appeal focus on <br /> affirming the merits of the district court's application of Caperton, <br /> Ready-Mix insists — and is joined by Colorado Municipal League as <br /> amicus curiae in this respect — that campaign contributions, as a <br /> categorical matter, can never give rise to a risk of actual bias by the <br /> quasi-judicial decision-maker. In rejecting this argument, the <br /> district court noted that Colorado courts have not directly <br /> addressed this issue. We do so now. <br /> 23 <br />