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and the apparent effect it had on the adjudication's outcome. Id. at <br /> 884-87. <br /> These due process mandates are not limited to judicial <br /> officers. Indeed, when decision-making by nonjudicial officers <br /> bears sufficient similarities to the adjudicatory function performed <br /> by courts, we consider it "quasi-judicial" and thereby subject to the <br /> basic requirements of due process. Ruff, 235 P.3d at 1056 (citing <br /> Cherry Hills Resort Dev. Co. v. City of Cherry Hills Vill., 757 P.2d <br /> 622, 625-26 (Colo. 1988)). While such actors must ensure the <br /> fundamental fairness of the proceeding, they are not held to the <br /> more rigorous disqualification standards applicable to judicial <br /> officers through ethical codes or local rules of procedure. Id. at <br /> 1057. Rather, the inquiry is simply whether actual bias or a risk of <br /> actual bias exists so as to compromise the neutrality of the <br /> quasi-judicial actor. Id. at 1056-57. <br /> 44 In this matter, the district court correctly noted that land-use <br /> decisions like Donnelly's are considered "quasi-judicial." See <br /> Margolis v. Dist. Ct., 638 P.2d 297, 305 (Colo. 1981). It also <br /> recognized that those serving in quasi-judicial capacities are <br /> presumed to act with "integrity, honesty, and impartiality," and that <br /> 22 <br />