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loss during transportation. Both pieces of equipment used for recovery operations <br /> were inspected for tailings before reuse. <br /> • The area was again inspected for any sign of tailings and samples were taken of the <br /> soil for verification of full recovery. <br /> b. Any known or adverse impacts to human health, property or the environment <br /> Due to the relatively dry/solid nature of the material, immediate identification and over <br /> excavated, no known impacts to human health or the environment have been observed <br /> or are expected to occur. <br /> As outlined above and within section d below, sampling has been undertaken to validate <br /> the success of material recovery. <br /> c. CC&V Contact <br /> For any further information regarding this event please contact; <br /> Meg Burt <br /> Senior Environmental Manager <br /> PO Box 191, <br /> 100 N 3rs St, <br /> Victor, Colorado, 80860 <br /> Work: 719-689-4055 <br /> Cell: 775-397-3571 <br /> Fax: 719-689-3254 <br /> d. Monitoring and analyses that are necessary to evaluate the situation and <br /> corrective actions <br /> Soil samples were taken for the detection of WAD CN at the dump location and the area <br /> immediately adjacent to establish a baseline sample and a control sample. Final soil <br /> samples were taken below the excavated area to ensure effectiveness of recovery. <br /> All samples were sent to an independent external laboratory for analysis and reporting. <br /> Photos of affected area, cleanup and inspection were taken for documentation. <br /> e. Results of the Operator's investigation <br /> The root cause of the spill was determined to be the inadequate inspection and clean-up <br /> of the 793F Haul Truck bed following use at LOB and prior to use in the pit as per the <br /> recently implemented procedure. <br /> Despite a focus on communication and personnel interaction, the investigation was <br /> unable to determine the reason for failing to inspect the truck bed. The unplanned <br /> downtime of the crushing circuit coupled with the event timing (immediately prior to shift <br /> change) likely left the new operator/supervisor unaware of buildup or even use at LOB <br /> before operation. <br />