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<br />J1J <br /> <br />f- <br /> <br />003006 <br /> <br />COLORADO WATER <br /> <br />June 1996 <br /> <br />level of development, theVpper Basin,vses .far less than its <br />"enlitlem"ent as. "long" as runoff"is near normal,. <br /> <br />THE LOWER BASIN SUFFERS CHRONIC WATER <br />SHORTAGES BUT BEARS LITTLE DROUGHT RISK <br /> <br />By the 1922 compact agreement, the Lower Basin gained the <br />assurance ora stable water supply at the expense of limiting <br />its long-tenn mean withdrawals to less than the amount <br />needed to meet its potential demands. Conversely. the Upper <br />l3asin states gained a long-term limitation on (he Lower <br />Basin's share of the system yield. aT the cost of assuming <br />almost the entire drought risk of the entIre basin. <br /> <br />OPPORTUNITIES EXIST FOR WIN-WIN RULE CHANGES <br /> <br />It would be relatively inexpensive for the Upper Basin and <br />Arizona to reduce their long-term claims upon Colorado River <br />water to enable California to meet already-exis[ing demands. <br />It would be similarly inexpensive ifCalifomia agreed to share <br />the burden of future droughl shortages more equally, thus <br />relieving what could be traumatic shonages in Upper Basin <br />slates, particularly Colorado, <br /> <br />ONLY MINOR CHANGES CAN BE MADE UNDER <br />EXiSTING RULES <br /> <br />The three SSD gaming experiments were conducted within the <br />lim ired context of those changes in interstate water allocation <br />believed to be attainable without changes in statutes or judicial <br />interpretations, The most striking aspect of the outcomes of <br />three drought gaming exercises was their similarity. The <br />players simply were unable to change those outcomes very <br />much through negotiating changes in the operating rules, even <br />though a great deal of communication occurred in both the <br />second and third garnes, and many water transfer deals were <br />successfully struck in the third game, <br /> <br />The players seemed to anempt, almost single-mindedly, to <br />maximize Colorado River water deliveries to their respective <br />states within and up to the limits of their compact <br />entitlements, It seems that, with the exception of the <br />equalization rule, the existing operating rules are hard to <br />improve upon, from the limited perspective of coming as close <br />as is possible to fulfilling compact entitlements, <br /> <br />RECOMMEND A nONS <br /> <br />Study participants recommend that the basin states and the federal government explore the possibility of replacing the <br />1922 compact with a federal interstate compact that: <br /> <br />. Establishes an interstate compact commission, perhaps modeled after that now in place in the Delaware River <br />Basin; <br /> <br />. Provides that this commission be served by a technical staff, either within the present Bureau of Reclamation or <br />apart from it, whose mission should be to conduct technical studies for the commission aimed at discovering <br />common interest solutions to drought and other water management problems; <br /> <br />. Establishes an advisory committee to the commission composed of representatives of all major water user <br />groups, including agricultural, industrial, and municipal water consumers, hydroelectric power interests, <br />environmental organizations, recreational users, and Indian tribes; <br /> <br />'- <br /> <br />. Mandates consideration of meeting nonconsumptive water demands and uses on a no less urgent and important <br />basis than that of serving consumptive uses; <br /> <br />. Establishes long-tenn allocations of Colorado River water in proportion to current demands, rather than to 1922 <br />allocations; <br /> <br />. Provides for proportional sharing of short-tenn (drought) shortages, much as does the current upper basin <br />compact; <br /> <br />. Is empowered to encourage and facilitate interstate water banking and marketing; and . . <br /> <br />. Is authorized to conduct joint explorations with Mexican entities of possibilities for restoring and maintaining the <br />estusrine ecosystem of the Gulf of California (Sea of Cortez), Equitable cost sharing provisions should be an <br />important part of such an innovation. <br />