<br />i
<br />ii The 1950s was a
<br />difficult decade for
<br />water users. Flood
<br />control measures were
<br />complicated and
<br />. costly; groundwater
<br />pumpmg began to
<br />i deplete surface flows.
<br />
<br />.\ capacity is removed as availa~Je "project
<br />:~ storage" and is reserved solely for flood
<br />control. Ji:iI
<br />
<br />; PROJECT REl.EASES
<br />
<br />i:1t was anticipated by the drafters of the
<br />;' compact that annual releases of 790,000 af
<br />(fTOrn project storage: would be needed to
<br />!~atisfy: New. Mexican, Texan~ and Mexican_"l
<br />; water needs b,etween Elephant Butte arid
<br />_~_ f'OrtQuitman, Texas.In recent years, _ '
<br />:j 1\oweyer, the a~nuaJ demand for project\:}
<br />[water has been'" slightly less than,700,OOO .
<br />; at,
<br />
<br />j UNOERDELlVERIESBY NEW MEXICO
<br />
<br />fNew Mexico has difficulties achieving its
<br />i ctelivery obligations to Elephant Buttt?
<br />under-certain climatic conditions. This
<br />; OCCUi's most commonly In years ofabun.,
<br />~_ dantshowfaU and spring runoff which
<br />\: fldwspast the inflow index gage at Otowi.
<br />; Ifsuch conditions are followed by a lack
<br />,: of summer thunderstorms, which create
<br />,~ most Of the inflow be!c)w Otowi~ New
<br />f Mex.i~o will likely underdeliver.
<br />
<br />THE 1985 SPILL. ~
<br />;~
<br />Althpugh no water actually flowed over
<br />, tl:teElephant B':ltte spillway, an #actual
<br />spillof usable water from project storage"
<br />occurred on June 13, 1985. This significant
<br />",eyent cancelled t~e accrued debits of both
<br />;- New Mexico and Colo~ado,Jn order to
<br />..prev~nt flooding in th~ town of Truth or
<br />t Consequences, the compact states had
<br />agreed to store spring flood waters in
<br />upstream reservoirs rather than at Ele-
<br />; phant Butte. Absent this storage,~a physi.
<br />: caI spill wou,ld have ocCurred at Elephant
<br />Butte; therefore, an "actual spill" as
<br />defined in thecompact resulted on paper.
<br />~This paper spill was not the same as a
<br />; "hypothetic~.J spill" as defined (somewhat
<br />,,~,mbiguously) in Article I of the compact.
<br />I Such ,8 hypothetical spill has never
<br />; occurred, nor is it expected to be applied.
<br />i Ahypothetical spill could only follow
<br />~. years in which more than 790,000 af were
<br />,released from project'storage.
<br />
<br />'-
<br />
<br />14
<br />
<br />001111
<br />
<br />lowed developments in the 1950s
<br />which have continuing influence on
<br />river management.
<br />
<br />CHALLENGES OF THE 1950s
<br />
<br />,
<br />
<br />In many ways, the 1950s was a diffi,
<br />cult decade for water users in the
<br />New Mexico portion of the Rio
<br />Grande basin north of Elephant
<br />Butte. Flood control measures were
<br />complicated and costly; ground water
<br />pumping began to deplete surface
<br />flows; and provisions of the Rio
<br />Grande Compact proved difficult to
<br />meet.
<br />
<br />In 1951, Texas sued New Mexico and
<br />the MRGCD for noncompliance with
<br />the Rio Grande Compact of 1938.
<br />Under the compact, New Mexico is
<br />obligated to deliver to Elephant Butte
<br />62% of the inflow to the middle reach
<br />of the Rio Grande as measured at
<br />Otowi bridge during a normal year.
<br />(Annual flow at Otowi averages
<br />nearly one million acre feet.) This
<br />percentage obligation falls slightly
<br />during dry years, and rises to greater
<br />than 75% during years of high runoff.
<br />The compact allows New Mexico to
<br />underdeliver up to a cumulative total
<br />of 200,000 acre feel.
<br />
<br />In 1951, records indicated that New
<br />Mexico, over the past decade, had
<br />underdelivered its compact obliga-
<br />tions to Elephant Butte by over
<br />300,000 at, Texas sued to have the debt
<br />repaid and to require New Mexico to
<br />regulate diversions from the middle
<br />valley in order to ensure future com-
<br />pliance. Although the suit was
<br />thrown out of Court on a legal techni-
<br />cality (Le, the United States, which
<br />was not part of the suit, was found to
<br />be an indispensible party), New Mex-
<br />ico looked at ways in which it could
<br />better meet its delivery requirements.
<br />One way was to remove impediments
<br />to flow down the riverbed, as was
<br />being pursued by the Bureau of
<br />Reclamation in its channel rectifica-
<br />tion program. The Bureau also con-
<br />structed a 2,000 cfs conveyance chan-
<br />nel from San Acacia to Elephant Butte
<br />Reservoir in order to prevent loss of
<br />the Rio Grande flow to seepage and
<br />evaporation from the aggraded river-
<br />bed in this 70- mile stretch,
<br />
<br />Another means of promoting the
<br />delivery of water downstream was to
<br />prevent the drilling of new wells that
<br />robbed the Rio Grande of surface
<br />flows. The New Mexico State
<br />Engineer took this step in 1956 and
<br />restricted new ground water use in
<br />the basin. Albuquerque, among
<br />others, was greatly affected by this
<br />basin closure since the city relied
<br />solely on ground water for its current
<br />and future supply. Although the pre.
<br />1956 level of ground water consump-
<br />tion was deemed a valid right, new
<br />water rights would have to be
<br />obtained from alternate sources. This
<br />provided incentive to initiate a trans~
<br />mountain diversion project to import
<br />water from the Colorado River basin.
<br />
<br />The Middle Rio Grande Conservancy
<br />DIstrict found itself challenged by the
<br />water management forces working
<br />within the basin in the 1950s, To help
<br />ease its burden, the District board
<br />decided to contract with the Bureau
<br />of Reclamation on a number of mat-
<br />ters. By 1956, the District had trans,
<br />ferred to the Bureau the responsibil-
<br />ity for operating MRGCD facilities,
<br />including EI Vado Reservoir. The
<br />Bureau also assumed the indebted-
<br />ness of the MRGCD and paid off the
<br />millions of dollars owed by the Dis-
<br />trict on the bonds it issued in the
<br />1930s. (MRGCD must repay the
<br />Bureau for this assumption as well as
<br />for Bureau work undertaken within
<br />the District. The District currently
<br />owes the Bureau more than $8 million
<br />with an interest-free annual repay-
<br />ment obligation of around $400,000.)
<br />
<br />THE FLOOD CONTROL ACT
<br />OF 1960
<br />
<br />The Flood Control Act of 1960
<br />brought a measure of relief to the
<br />water managers of the Rio Grande
<br />basin. The Act authorized two addi-
<br />tional reservoirs as part of the Middle
<br />Rio Grande Project. GaBsteo Dam
<br />was completed in 1970 to control sum~
<br />mer flooding and sediment deposi-
<br />tion from Galisteo Creek, while
<br />Cochiti Dam became operational in
<br />1975 as a mainstem flood control
<br />structure and recreational site. Cochiti,
<br />with a total capacity of 602,000 at
<br />when completed, was one of the ten
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