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G,),) , ;:i puts such "off-land" users as municipalities in a better position than they would occupy under the American Rule. Early appropriators for off-land users are favored over later appropriators, Over- lying landowners. however, are treated some- what equally in that they can be ratably restricted in times of shortage. Large volume users, how- ever, are favored over low-volume users since user rights are correlated on the basis of current and beneficial needs. Early users are favored somewhat over later users or deferred users since the California Ruledoes not permitwaterto be saved tor future use. Physical-Hydrologic and Environmental Impacts The operation of the California Rule is much too complex. 10 facilitate an accurate description of physical-hydrologic and environmental impacts. The most that can be said is that the rule offers a potential to prevent total exhaustion of an aquifer because of provisions that mandate sharing and pro rata reductions in time of shortage. Alternative #5: Adopt a Rule of Reasonable Use as developed in certain eastern states as the definition of groundwater property rights in Nebraska. Description and Methods of Implementation Certain eastern states have resolved ground- water disputes on the basis of riparian principles. namely on a substantive determination of what use is reasonable in a given circumstance.3D Where riparian principles are applied, the rights of individual landowners overlying an aquifer are correlated. Landowners have a right to use groundwater but only to the extent that others are not injured thereby. The American Rule. in contraSl,sanctlons uses which injure other over- lying landowners by depleting the aquifer as long as the depleting landowner is not transporting the water off the overlying land. An extreme interpretation of this rule would limit extractions to no more than the sustainable yield of the aquifer. A more relaxed version 01 the rule would permit aquifer dewatering. but only as long as court-defined superior uses were not interfered with. Such ad hoc determinations create great uncertainty of right, so much un- certainty in fact. that the rule probably cannot function as a rule of property but only as a rule of tort. A more complete development of the tort law approach to groundwater property rights is discussed in Alternative #6. Socio-Economic Impacts While a reasonable use rule would be extreme- ly flexible, it would offer landowners almost no security of right. The investment deterrent of potential future ad hoc determinations of use rights would act as a significant barrier to attain. ing economic efficiency in water use. In some respects. this rule is even less secure than the Engish Rule since a landowner cannot rely on an ability to out-capture his neighbor. On the other hand, the flexibility of the rule would permit judges to reallocate water in a more efficient manner if the circumstances demanded realloca- tion_ Judges would not necessarily strive for economic efficiency. however, nor would they necessarily be capable of evaluating economic effiCiency in use even if that were perceived as a goal. The ad hoc nature 01 use determinations under this rule makes it impossible to evaluate equity impacts. All that can be said is that no particular groups are inherently favored over other parti- cular groups of users. Physical-Hyrologic and Environmental Impacts Since property rights would be subject to ad hoc judicial interpretation under this alternative, no basis exists to predict physical-hydrologic or environmental impacts. While judicial power could be used to minimize adverse impacts, the rule offers no assurance that judicial power would, in fact. be used to minimize adverse impacts. Alternative #6: Adopt the reason. able use rules found in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 9 858 as the definition of groundwater property rights in Nebraska. Description and Methods of Implementation RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 9 858 (1979) provides as follows: Liability for Use of Groundwater (1) A proprietor of land or his grantee who withdraws groundwater from the land and uses it for a beneficial purpose is not subject to liability for interference with the use of water by another, unless (a) the withdrawal of groundwater unreason- 3-9