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WSP03064
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Last modified
1/26/2010 12:48:28 PM
Creation date
10/11/2006 11:31:17 PM
Metadata
Fields
Template:
Water Supply Protection
File Number
8407.400
Description
Platte River Basin - River Basin General Publications - Nebraska
State
NE
Basin
South Platte
Water Division
1
Date
1/1/1983
Author
Nebraska Natural Res
Title
Policy Issue Study on Selected Water Rights Issues - Property Rights in Groundwater
Water Supply Pro - Doc Type
Report/Study
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<br />overlying owner. Overlying rights are correlative <br />like those of surface riparians. Each owner's fair <br />share of water is based on current and beneficial <br />needs, not on the history of past use. The dom- <br />inant concern of the court is maximizing bene- <br />ficial and productive use of water. <br />The California Rule has also come understress <br />as water supplies have become more critical. In <br />Los Angeles v. San Fernando,29 the California <br />Supreme Court reexamined the doctrine of <br />mutual prescription and severely limited its <br />scope by holding that California law prohibits <br />cities from losing title to water rights by pre- <br />scription. Absent the holding in San Fernando, <br />Los Angeles would have lost priority that it <br />claimed based on the existence of historic <br />pueblo rights and on the importation of water <br />from the Owens valley. The court also limited the <br />doctrine of mutual prescription as applied to <br />private parties by requiring a specific finding of <br />actual or constructive notice of the existence of <br />an overdraft before the statutory period begins to <br />run. In addition, the court held that years of <br />surplus break the continuity necessary for the <br />running of a prescriptive period. In the wake of <br />San Fernando, the following propositions regard- <br />ing the California Rule hold: <br /> <br />1) Cities acquire rights to the return flows <br />from imported waters which are superior <br />to any overlying or appropriative rights in <br />native water. <br />2) Overlying landowners are entitled to use <br />the amount of native water they can putto <br />reasonable and beneficial use on the <br />overlying land less any right lost by <br />prescription. <br />3) Holders of appropriative rights to ground- <br />water are entitled to have such supplies <br />allocated under the principle that first in <br />time is first in right unless their appropri- <br />ative right has been obliterated by mutual <br />prescription. Prescriptive rights cannot <br />be acquired against a city. <br /> <br />The real impact of the California Rule has not <br />been in allocating water supplies, but rather in <br />determining who must pay for more expensive <br />imported water. The history of the California Rule <br />has been an evolving attempt to devise a <br />property rule which permits maximum efficient <br />use of water. As economic and physical con- <br />ditions changed, the rule evolved often in a <br />tortured manner as courts struggled to maintain <br />some consistency with what had gone before. <br />The dominant concern has been to preserve <br />investments in water. Thus, the English Rule was <br />rejected and landowners were assured some <br />rights to groundwater, rights that encouraged <br /> <br />3-8 <br /> <br />investment. Appropriation of surplus waters was <br />permitted to encourage use. Eventually, mutual <br />prescription was developed to insure that large <br />investments in groundwater development would <br />not be totally lost. As imported water became <br />more important, the doctrine of mutual pre- <br />scription was restricted to facilitate a more <br />"equitable" sharing of the costs of the importa- <br />tion. <br />An unfortunate side effect of the development <br />of the California Rule has been the development <br />of legal fictions to justify imposition of a legal <br />doctrine (such as implying constructive notice of <br />the beginning of an overdraft in Pasadena, when <br />the existence of such an overdraft could only be <br />determined by massive expenditures on hydro- <br />logic investigations years later). These legal <br />fictions have kept groundwater users from <br />achieving any degree of certainty as to the nature <br />of their rights, at least until recently. Ironically, it <br />was a felt need for certainty which led the <br />California courts to develop the rule of correla- <br />tive rights in the first instance. <br /> <br />Socio-Economic Impacts <br /> <br />The economic impacts of the California Rule <br />are exceedingly difficult to articulate. Rights in <br />theory are more secure than under either the <br />English Rule or the American Rule due to the <br />"sharing" notion when an overdraft occurs. This <br />increased security of right, however, is signifi- <br />cantly lessened by the possibility that rights can <br />be lost through prescription. Since the statute of <br />limitations on prescription begins to run when an <br />overdraft commences, the security of an over- <br />lying landowner's right can only be preserved by <br />extreme vigilance in the form of expensive and <br />sophisticated hydrologic monitoring. Since <br />"excess" groundwater supplies in a basin are <br />subject to prior appropriation, off-land appropri- <br />ators have secure rights only insofar as they hold <br />early appropriations and surplus waters continue <br />to exist. <br />A major economic advantage of the California <br />Rule is its flexibility. Its emphasis on "sharing" in <br />a variety of circumstances insures that major <br />water investments will not be lost totally. Under <br />the California Rule, a state also has great latitude <br />in adopting regulations without encountering <br />constitutional difficulties. The California Rule <br />thus tends to facilitate efficient use of ground- <br />water but in no way mandates efficient use. <br />The equity impacts of the California Rule also <br />are extremely difficult to isolate. Overlying <br />owners ostensibly are favored over off-land <br />users, but the possibility of the prescriptive loss <br />of rights severely limits this advantage. More- <br />over, the ability to appropriate "excess" water <br />
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