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<br />003315
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<br />years ago. The Secretary of the Interior hll;8 now made
<br />definitive executive interpretations which sweep aside
<br />inconsistencies and ambiguities. The Secretary has
<br />overruled Interior Department actions that were con-
<br />trary to his determination. If this action had occurred
<br />earlier it to a large extent, would have removed any
<br />choice that the prior Master may have had regarding
<br />the proper boundaries.
<br />Even if the course of the proceedings in this case
<br />did not indicate such a result, the normal treatment of
<br />similar situations reveals that secretarial orders resolv-
<br />ing those problems are appropriate determinations for
<br />adoption by reference in this litigation as a ~e88uring
<br />stick for determining additional irrigable acreage. In
<br />large part we are concerned with actions by the Secre-
<br />tary of Interior" concerning lines surveyed between
<br />the public lands of the United States and Indian reser-
<br />vations whose concern is a matter of the highest prior-
<br />ity to the Uiuted States. The United States, in the ex-
<br />ercise of its plenary power. to regulate Indian affairs, II
<br />may establish Indian reservations by executive order.
<br />Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598 (1963)... The
<br />Secretary and the Interior Department by surveys and
<br />other means undoubtedly may determine or correct
<br />boundary lines in public lands. See 43 U.S.C. U 1, 2,
<br />751, 752, 772 (1976). See also 25 U.S.C. !i 176 (1976).
<br />Once determined the boundaries fixed by these
<br />
<br />surveys are conclusive in collateral proceedings, be-
<br />cause the matter rests within the jurisdiction of the
<br />executive branch. Boraz Consolidated Ltd. v. City of
<br />Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 16-17 (1935); Stoneroad v.
<br />Sto,:eroad, 158 U.S. 240, 250-52(1895); Knight v.
<br />Umted States Land Association, 142 U.S. 161, 176.78
<br />(1891); Cragin v. Powell. 128 U.S. 691, 698-99 (1888).
<br />In fact, the Court explained that its rationale for the
<br />conclusive effect given to the Interior Department's
<br />survey, was to eliminate the necessity for a landholder
<br />to litigate "in every action at law between itse1f and its
<br />neighbors, . . the question of the accuracy of the sur-
<br />vey." Russell v. Mazwell Land Grant Co., 158 U.S.
<br />253, ~6 (1895).
<br />
<br />And in the nature of things a survey made
<br />by . the government must be held conclusive
<br />agaInst any collateral attack in controversies be-
<br />tween individuals. There must be some tribunal
<br />to which final jurisdiction is given in respect to
<br />the matter of surveys, and no other tribunal is
<br />so competent to deal with the matter as the
<br />Land Dep~ent. None other is nllIDed in the
<br />statutes. If In every controversy between neigh-
<br />bors the accuracy of a survey made by the gov-
<br />ernme!1t were open to questioD, interminable
<br />confusion would ensue.
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<br />[d. at 258. If the Bureau of Land Management, or ita
<br />predecessor the General Land Office, 1946 Reorg. Plan
<br />No.3, 5 403, 11 Fed. Reg. 7876, reprinted in, 43
<br />U.S.C.A. 5 1 note (1964), prepared a survey which the
<br />courts must regard as conclusive, a dissatisfied litigant
<br />might still appeal to the Secretary of the Interior, as
<br />has happened in this case. Stoneroad v. Stoneroad,
<br />158 U.S. 240, 253 (1895); Knight v. United States
<br />Land Association, 142 U.So 161, 177-78 (1891); Snyder
<br />
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<br />90. No contention is raised that the Act of Congress, 88 Stat. 268
<br />(1974), extending the boundary of the Cocopeh Reservation, is subject to
<br />redeterminetion.
<br />91. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Common, 411 U.S.
<br />164, 168.69 (1973); United Statea v. Kegema, 118 U.S. 376, 38~.82 (1886).
<br />92. In its 1963 Opinion, tha Court counted tha creation of the
<br />Chemehuevi Indian Reservation by the Secretary of the Interior 81 tha
<br />creation of a reservetion by Executive Order. 373 U.S. at 696 n.l00.
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