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0033H for the boundary disputes mentioned in the Court's opinion, all parties in the original litigation were deal- ing with boundaries set either by acts of Congress or by executive order. Whatever challenge might have been raised to these, no State Party contested the right of the Court to accept as final and binding for the purpose of that litigation such established bound- aries. These were all deemed to be final for the pur- pose of the water allotments then presented to the Court. The treatment of the boundary disputes suggests an intention similarly to adopt by reference determi- nations of the disputed boundaries. That it was "un- necessary" to determine those disputes "here" indi- cates that it was adequate to do so elsewhere. And rather than making some specific provision for the de- termination of the boundary disputes, cf. Oklahoma v. Texas, 256 U.S. 602, 605-07 (1921). the Court merely left its decree open to adjustment "in the event" the disputes were resolved. This conditional language be- lies any intent to settle the disputes. The language the Court used with respect to a potentiBl dispute. while it concedes the possibility that the Court might be re- quired to settle title disputes, seeIIlll clearly to indicate that any dispute with respect to secretarial action would be instituted by a party which was refused water, in other words, a party claiming title to the land not one seeking a collaterBl determination of ti- , . tIe... It is evident that the Court, in the sparmg exer- cise of its original jurisdiction, contemplated that the boundaries of the Reservations would be determined elsewhere, and such determination relied on for the purpose of allocating water rights. This conclusion appears particularly appropriate in light of the nature of the dispute in the earlier pro- ceedings. Generally speaking, those disputes concerned conflicting positions within the Interior Department or ambiguities in the description of boundaries. A signifi- cant amount of relevant executive action has tran- spired in the interim. · The various SecretariBl Orders have defined the ambiguities or removed the inconsistencies which ear- lier caused uncertainty. I see no need to further ques- tion the boundary determinations in this case. There is really no doubt regarding where the government pres- ently draws the boundary lines between the parcels of public land in question. The disputes presented to the prior Master and the Court no longer exist. The Court in 1963 rebuffed the earlier Master's at- tempt to choose from among the various interpreta- tions of the executive department regarding these boundaries. There is no reason to believe that the Court would be more receptive to a present Master's attempt at adjudication of the boundaries. In fact there is good reason to believe that such a course would be more ill-advised today than over twenty euept in aa:ordaDce with theee provieione. Instead the Decree provided ror en adjuatment by qreemant or decree. While a..armn, the Secretary discretion to deli_ additional ..eter to the disputed areae would affirm the condueion thet bounduy determina- tiODO by the Secretary should be accepted u llnal, Jimitin. that discr.. tion to inetaDcea where there is agreemant IUDIlI1lI the partiee doee not alfect the conclUllion that the Court prefened that the boundarlea of tha Reservatione be settled elsewhere. 89. This reference to the Secretary'. "refusal" to deliver water to the . disputed areas appears to have contemplated thet the ~etary would have discretion to determine whether water should be delivered to the disputed lands. Such discretion is incoDBistent with the ultimate decr.e, which b8lled righla for the ReservatioDB on irrigahle acrea without involv- ing the dieputed lands and enjoined the Secretary from delivering water 66 67