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.. salinity level the Mexicans were experiencing at the time.) It cut off legal arguments over parity and salt tJalance, and it greatly narrowed the range of options available to improve water quality. (;:> ~ l.. c:o Buyingottt and shutting down irrigation operations at Wellton-Mohawk, wholly or in part, was thought tq be politically unacceptable to the Colorado Basin states, as well as very cost;ly. It had been included on the Task Force's list of solutions for completeness. With the Kissinger decision, ~ permanent solution based on bypassing drainage and substituting higher-quai/ity water from other sources became impractical or politically unattractive. The volume of wa~ needed would be double that initially required to achieve salt balance equivalence, and it would be needed in!perpetuity. In his meetings with the Committee of Fourteen, Brownell had already. assured the ColQrado Basin sta~ that the solution to the Mexican problem would cost them neither water nor money; and would not adversely affect further water resource development in the Basin. Auglllent;ation of the limited and over-appropriated waters of the Colorado was many years away. 1'he states would be :unlikely to accept any solution requiring indefinite use of waters in the $asin for substitutiop. This left two categories of solutions: desalting of return flows and reducing salt loading through improved irrigation management. Within thc;l Department of the Interior, two groups contended for the Secretary's ear. The Bureau of ~eclamation, which had built most of the Federal water resource developmentproJects along the Cl:olorado River, had close ties to water users. Its leadership had favored a solution based on ~t balance. The Office of Saline Water (OSW) argued strongly for a mammoth desalting plaIit-the largest in the world. Its leadership saw the Mexieanproblem as an opportunity to demonstrate the technology whose development it had fostered over twenty years, and to rebuild support for its program. , '~ t,! , ~ ',,: At the time, of Echeverria's visit, OSW had even lobbied the White House for a $140 million, 200 mgd pllmt near Yuma, Arizona,.-and allowed word of it to reachTh(! Wall Str(!(!t JQurnpl.17 Kissinger r~portedlywas intrigued by the possibilities of this new technology,!8Even, EchevelTia" seemed to ijave caught some. of the spirj.t... In his speech to Congress, he' said: "Itisimj)lOssible .'. . to understa\1d why the United States does not use the same boldness and imagination that it applies to ~omplex problems with its enemies to the solution of simple problems with its . friends. "19 ':p: f~ t~ .~ ,'iil "'-.;:. " '-, ;,,\;~ When Kissiqger's message .reached Interior, the advocates of desalting pressed their case. While Reclamatioq's top managers were out of the country, Assistant Secretary Smith decided that Reclamation should be represented on the Working Group by the Planning staff (which had responsibilio/ for new technologies) rather than by the Water Operations staff. (Water Operations was responsible for overseeing operation and maintenance of completed projeCts such as Wellton-Mohawk, and administering the water users' service contracts for water from these projects. Its'managers had supported a salt balance approach.) And OSW would be represented by its own staff, not Reclamation's. .~ ')-5\1 ,~ 1 ~~ , .~ ,';, , , During the first week in October of 1972, Brownell and his staff visited Wellton-Mohawk, toured the border area, and were given an introduction to desalting technology. suite and ".~ ~;.w ~'" ';;';.~ ~ ) !~ c' ".....1' . , :r~ ,...c.o 7