WSPC02678 - Laserfiche WebLink

Home Browse Search

0[2157 immediate reduction in salinity, preserve the legal positions of both parties during negotiations over ultimate salinity levels, and defer capital expenditures or politically unpopular decisions. The Colorado Basin states had been willing to support the equivalent salt balance concept 1 presumably they would agree to the use of substitution water from a source within the Basin for a limited period. ) Minute No. 241, the interim Minute required by the joint communique, was signed on July 14. It reflected this approach: the U.S agreed to bypass 118,000 acre-feet of Well ton-Mohawk drainage per year, replacing it with additional water released from Imperial Dam. This action would have reduced the salinity l~vel at Morelos Dam from 1,240 ppm (under Minute No. 218, the interim 1965 agreement) to 1,140 ppm--the salt balance level, though the term was not mentioned. Mexico, however, asked the U.S. to bypass the remaining 100,OQO acre-feet of drainage without substitution, which resulted in a salinity level of about 950 to 1000 ppm. ., Here the diplomatic situation becomes murky. Why did Mexico agree to let the U.S. limit its efforts, even in the interim, to guaranteeing a level of salinity corresponding to that resulting from salt balance? Why did its government then ask that remaining drainage flows be bypassed without compensation? Former U.S. Commissioner of the IBWC Joseph Friedkin recalls: "By the time the Presidents met in June, 1972, it was clear that there was no longer an opportunity to reach an agreement with Mexico on the salt balance principle. Mexico was unwilling to accept any Well ton-Mohawk drainage waters as treaty deliveries."5 From this perspective, Mexico's wasting of the balance of the Well ton-Mohawk drainage must be seen as an effort to preserve its claim to water of Imperial Dam quality. 6